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Who's Your Momma, Who Are Your Daddies?
Louisiana's New Law of Filiation
KatherineShaw Spaht*
I. INTRODUCTION

A Louisiana State Law Institute project that commenced in
1991 with meetings of the Marriage/Persons Committee
culminated in the enactment of a series of new Civil Code articles
in 2005. The new articles both reshape the organization and
arrangement of articles on proof of filiation, and respond to the
challenges left in the wake of decisions by the United States and
Louisiana Supreme Courts in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. 2 To
a lesser extent, the articles also respond to challenges presented bN
the cutting-edge issues of assisted conception and reproduction.
Just one year after the legislature enacted these new articles, it
enacted implementing legislation contained in Act of the Louisiana
Legislature No. 322 of 2006, which made changes in
complementary legal provisions governing proof of filiation
necessitated by the previous year's enactment. During the 2006
regular legislative session, negotiations over the implementing
legislation with the Department of Social Services revealed the full
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Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, Louisiana State University.
1. The predecessor articles had not been reorganized since the decisions
referred to infra note 2, which resulted in eliminating the legal distinctions
between legitimate and illegitimate children, a distinction critical to the
organization of the Civil Code articles before the constitutional decisions.
Piecemeal revision legislation was enacted in 1979 and 1981, but not until 2005
did the organization of chapters reflect the constitutional reality of the law of
filiation. Furthermore, the same constitutional impetus compelled the 2004 Act
that eliminated the word illegitimate and substituted in its place, child born
outside of marriage. See 2004 La. Acts No. 26.
2. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 763 (1977); Succession of
Clivens, 426 So. 2d 585 (La. 1983); Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La.
*

1980).
3. When it was obvious that more expertise was necessary from fields
other than the law, the legislature created a task force composed of law
professors, legislators, doctors, nurses, other health professionals, and clergy.
The Task Force report issued at the conclusion of that deliberative process
appears at the end of this article as Appendix A. Legislation that owes its
existence to Task Force recommendations is also referenced in Part II of this
article.
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extent of the current federalization of state family law and federal
intervention into policy decisions historically reserved to the states.
This article will explore the policy decisions that shaped the
new Civil Code articles on proving filiation, both during Law
Institute Marriage/Persons Committee meetings and Council
meetings, as well as during the two-year legislative process. Two
other articles in this issue concentrate on different aspects of the
same revision: a detailed article-by-article analysis and critique of4
the new law by a member of the Marriage/Persons Committee,
and an examination of the new articles permitting a mother, for the
first time and subject to restrictions, to contest the paternity of her
husband.5 To assist in a discussion of the policies underlying
many of the more significant changes, there are three appendices
attached to this article: first, two reports of the legislative Task
Force on Assisted Conception ("Task Force"); second, the
document distributed at the Law Institute Council ("Council")
meetings posing the issues surrounding the judicial recognition of
"dual paternity"; 7 and third, a document prepared during the 2006
legislative session by Jim Carter, staff attorney for the Law
Institute, that dissects mandatory federal legislation to which he
a list of pertinent Louisiana statutes constituting
then correlates
8
compliance.
For the Law Institute's Marriage/Persons Committee, Act of
the Louisiana Legislature No. 192 of 2005 represents fourteen
years of concentrated work. Meetings at which the topic of
By far the most
filiation were discussed began in 1991.
controversial and difficult issue discussed was dual paternity,
considered by the Law Institute Council on six separate occasions.
When and under what circumstances should a child whose filiation
is established be permitted to establish that a second person is his
biological father, and what should the legal consequences be?
Many of those meetings ended with the Council's having reached a
result that conflicted with the result reached at a previous meeting.
Because the legislature created the Task Force on Assisted
Conception, the bulk of those legal issues were bypassed at the
Law Institute. Nonetheless, for the first time, the Civil Code now
contains an article identifying the mother of the child, 9 unnecessary
4. J.-R. Trahan, Glossae on the New Law of Filiation,67 LA. L. REv. 387

(2007).

5. Lucie R. Kantrow, Comment, Presumption Junction: Honey, You
Weren't Partof the Function,67 LA. L. REv. 633 (2007).
6. See infra app. A.
7. See infra app. B.
8. See infra app. C.
9. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2006).
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practically before the development of techniques for assisted
reproduction such as in vitro fertilization and gestational and/or
genetic surrogacy. Yet, of all the lessons learned in the enactment
of both the substantive law of filiation and its implementing
legislation, the most salient is the extent to which the federal
government now regulates the subject matter of family law,
traditionally reserved to the states. It does so rather directly with
"strings" attached to federal funds in the form of requirements
imposed upon state law, and less directly by administrative
regulations and interpretations of state and federal law by the
federal agency's attorneys. The average American would find the
extent of federal intrusion remarkable, especially as authorized
during the administration of a Republican president.
II. IDENTIFICATION OF MOTHER
For the first time the Civil Code of Louisiana contains
language identifying the mother of a child as "the woman who
gives birth to the child."' 0 The scientific developments in assisted
reproduction that necessitated a definition of motherhood, or what
common law authorities would describe as a "default" rule, receive
recognition in the reference at the end of the same Civil Code
'
article with the language "except as otherwise provided by law."' I
Clearly, the vast majority of genetic mothers do indeed give birth
to their children in Louisiana since enforceable contracts for paid
genetic/gestational surrogacy are prohibited, 12 and only in a narrow
set of circumstances does Louisiana law permit the genetic mother
to arrange for gestational surrogacy by a relative.' 3 Otherwise, the
gestational "mother," who does not supply the egg, underRoes in
vitro fertilization within the meaning of Louisiana's statute, gives
birth to a child, and constructively adopts the fetus and resulting
child under Louisiana law, at least if she is married. 15 Even if the
gestational mother is not married, the general rule of article 184
applies and identifies the mother as she who gave birth.
The narrow exceptions to the principle that the woman giving
birth to the child is the mother, which are cross-referenced in the
10. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.art. 184 cmt. (a) (2006).
11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2006).
12. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2006).
13. Id. § 40:34.
14. Id. § 9:121.
15. Id. § 9:130 ("Constructive fulfillment of the statutory provisions for
adoption in this state shall occur when a married couple executes a notarial act
of adoption of the in vitro fertilized ovum and birth occurs.").
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official comments to article 184,16 obviously create their own set
of problems, leaving many unanswered questions.' 7 Because the
legislative Task Force on Assisted Conception existed and it had
issued both a majority and a minority report,' 8 the Council of the
Law Institute chose to defer to those recommendations already
submitted to the Louisiana Legislature. The legislature has yet to
act on the recommendations of the Task Force, but any such action
will now occur against the backdrop of the principle contained in
article 184-the woman who gives birth to a child is that child's
mother.
III. PRESUMPTION APPLIED TO FIRST AND SECOND HUSBANDS:
DISAVOWAL AND RESURRECTION OF PRESUMPTION

Before June 29, 2005, when there were "overlapping"
presumptions such that two different husbands of the mother were
presumed to be the father of the child, the law resolved the conflict
by identifying the husband of the mother at the time of conception
as the father. 9 Overlapping presumptions of paternity resulted
from the amendment in 1976 to Civil Code article 184 that
expressly extended the presumption of paternity to the husband of
the mother of a child born during their marriage. 20 Thus, a child
conceived during a first marriaie because born within three
hundred days of its termination' but born during a second
16. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 184 cmt. (c) (2006) ("For exceptions provided
by other laws, see R.S. 9:121-133; R.S. 40:32 (definition of 'biological parents'
to include husband and wife providing sperm and egg for in vitro fertilization by
physician and fetus is carried by surrogate birth parent who is blood relative of
either the husband or the wife); R.S. 40:34(B)(1)(h)(v) and (B)(1)(j) (birth
certificate reflect mother and father as married couple who donate gametes when
child born to a gestational surrogate by in vitro fertilization who is a relative of
the husband or wife).").
17. See Sandi Varnado, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: A Legitimate
Question Given Louisiana's Lack of Legislation Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 66 LA. L. REv. 609 (2006).
18. See infra app. A for these recommendations.
19. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 186 (2005), repealed by 2005 La. Acts No.
192, § 1 ("The husband of the mother is not presumed to be the father of the
child if another man is presumed to be the father.").
20. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2005), amended by 1976 La. Acts No.
430, § 1 ("The husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of all children
born or conceived during the marriage.").
21. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2005), repealed by 2005 La. Acts No.
192, § 1 ("A child born less than three hundred days after the dissolution of the
marriage is presumed to have been conceived during the marriage. A child born
three hundred days or more after the dissolution of the marriage is not presumed
to be the child of the husband.").
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marriage was presumed to be the child of both husbands. Prior to
its amendment in 1976 and the repeal of Civil Code article 137, the
overlap theoretically did not exist because a woman was prohibited
from marrying within ten months of dissolution
22 of her first
marriage on pain of nullity of her second marriage.
Despite the Law Institute's recommendation to revise the result
in overlapping presumption cases based upon the cause for
termination of the marriage, 23 the legislature chose to retain the
result reached by the predecessor article: "If a child is born within
three hundred days from the day of the termination of a marriage
and his mother has married again before his birth, the first husband
is presumed to be the father." 24 This article is the only one in
Chapter 2 without an official comment because the Senate
Committee amendment that restored the content of the first
paragraph of article 186 to that of its predecessor also deleted the
comment.
Unlike its predecessor, however, article 186 recognizes that the
interests of two different husbands, as well as the child, are
involved.
New article 186 envisions and provides for the
possibility that the husband of the first marriage might seek to
disavow the child born to his former wife, a possibility heightened
by the increasing leniency of the law as it relates to the time period
applicable to the disavowal action.25 To assure protection of the
22.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 137 (1870), repealed by 1970 La. Acts No.

108, § 1 ("The wife shall not be at liberty to contract another marriage, until ten
months after the dissolution of her preceding marriage.").
23. As originally introduced on recommendation of the Louisiana State Law
Institute, proposed Civil Code article 186 read, "If a child is born within three
hundred days from the day of the termination of a marriage and his mother has
married again before his birth: (1) The second husband is presumed to be the
father if the previous marriage was terminated by judgment of divorce,
declaration of nullity, or declaration of death under Article 54. (2) The first
husband is presumed to be the father if the previous marriage was terminated by
death." H.R. 91, 2005 Reg. Sess. (La.), available at http://www.legis.state.la.us/
The reason for the distinction in
billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=291659.
result based upon the cause for termination of the marriage of the husband and
the mother was extensively explained in the comments. For example, comment
(b) read, "The distinction made by this Article between causes for termination of
the marriage is based on the assumption that if the cause for termination of the
marriage is divorce, declaration of nullity or of death under Civil Code Articles
47 and 54 (rev. 1990), the husband of the mother at the time of the birth of the
child is often more likely to be the father." Id.
24.
25.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 186 (2005) (amended 2006).
LA. CW. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2006) ("The action for disavowal of

paternity is subject to a liberative prescription of one year. This prescription
commences to run from the day the husband learns or should have learned of the
birth of the child. Nevertheless, if the husband lived separateand apartfrom the
mother continuously during the birth of the child, this prescription does not
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second husband who will be affected if the first husband's
disavowal action27 is successful, 26 the second husband must be a
party to the suit.
Furthermore, article 186 explicitly provides that, should the
first husband to whom the presumption of paternity applied be
successful in his disavowal action, the second husband "is
presumed to be the father." 28 In other words, the presumption that
had applied to the second husband because the child was born
during his marriage to the mother and then was displaced is
effectively "resurrected" upon the success of the first husband's
disavowal action. Because the second husband must be made a
party to the disavowal action of the first husband, he receives
notice of the potential effect of the action upon him-that he will
once again be presumed to be the father of the child if the first
husband is successful. As a consequence of the "resurrection" of
the presumption of paternity applied to the second husband, article
186 recognizes that he, too, must be given an opportunity to
disavow the child born to his wife. However, the time period of
one year during which he may institute a disavowal action is
explicitly peremptive, rather than prescriptive. 29 In addition, the
time period commences to run "from the day that the judgment of
30
disavowal obtained by the first husband is final and definitive."
The decision to convert the time period for disavowal by the
second husband from prescription to peremption relies upon the
following rationales: (1) the time period during which the first
husband may institute the disavowal action is liberal and could
conceivably be lengthy; (2) the second husband received notice by
service of the first husband's petition for disavowal that he could
be presumed to be the father if the first husband proves to be

commence to run until the husband is notified in writing that a party in interest
has assertedthat the husband is the father of the child.") (emphasis added). See
also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 189 cmt. (a) (2006) ("The only change in law
made by this Article is that the period of time for instituting a disavowal action
under this Article is explicitly prescriptive, overruling Pounds v. Schori (former
Civil Code Article 189, the predecessor to this Article, contained a peremptive
period for the disavowal action."). The heirs of the first husband are also
extended this same liberal time period. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 190 (2006).
26. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 186 (2006).
27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:401(A) (as added by 2006 La. Acts No. 344, §
4) ("A person who will be presumed to be the father under Civil Code Article
186 if the plaintiff obtains a judgment of disavowal shall be made a party to the
disavowal action and shall be served with process.").
28. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 186 (2006).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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successful; (3) the second husband has ample opportunity to
prepare for the filing of his own action for disavowal considering
both the length of the time period for filing and the length of the
litigation involved in the first husband's action; and (4) the interest
of the child demands resolution of its paternity within a reasonable
period of time. The second paragraph of article 186 and its
implementing legislation 3 1 attempt to balance fairly the interests of
three directly affected parties--the two husbands as well as the
child.
IV.

CONTESTATION ACTION BY THE MOTHER: NEW BUT LIMITED

Although the new action extended to the mother of the child
to contest her husband's paternity is subsequently discussed in
great detail in this issue by another author, 32 it is appropriate here
to explain why the Law Institute recommended the new action be
included in the revision. Once that decision was made, it is
likewise appropriate to explain why the Law Institute decided to
limit the scope of the contestation action more so than its French
For the first time, Louisiana law permits the
counterpart.
mother to contest the paternity of her husband, but the mother
may institute this action only if she is presently married and the
"present husband has acknowledged the child by authentic act or
by signing the birth certificate." 34 Furthermore, the action to
contest must be "instituted within a peremptive period of one
hundred eighty days from the marriage to her present husband
35
and also within two years from the day of the birth of the child,
31. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:401 (2006) (as added by 2006 La. Acts No.
344, § 4).
32. See Kantrow, supra note 5.

33. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (a) (2006) ("This Article is new.
Under many statutory schemes regulating disavowal of paternity the mother of a
child is permitted to disprove her husband's paternity. See, e.g., French Civil
Code Articles 318, 318.1; Uniform Parentage Act 6(a); Quebec Civil Code

Article 275; Cal. Civil Code § 7006.").
34. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006) ("The mother of a child may
institute an action to establish both that her former husband is not the father of
the child and that her present husband is the father. This action may be
instituted only if the present husband has acknowledged the child by authentic

act or by signing the birth certificate.").
35.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2006). See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.

193 cmt. (2006) ("The time period for instituting this action is similar to that of
French Civil Code Article 318.1 in that both actions must be brought within six
months of the inception of the marriage. This Article departs from the French
article, however, in requiring that the action be instituted before the child has
attained the age of two years. Under French Civil Code Article 318.1 the action
must be instituted before the child has reached the age of seven years.").
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which is the locus of the difference between the Louisiana
contestation action and that of the French.36
Arguably, the mother's contestation action assists in
accomplishing one clearly stated objective of the revision of the
law of filiation: to more closely align biological and legal
paternity. Yet, the series of articles devoted to the mother's
contestation action recognizes that this alignment must pose the
37
least possibility of potential harm to the child and the family.
The objective of aligning biological and legal paternity
principally reflects dissatisfaction with the historical application
of the presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of
the child conceived or born during marriage. 38 The presumption
had become virtually irrebuttable. Even before the Law Institute
revision passed in 2005, legislative changes to the time period for
instituting a disavowal action markedly liberalized the rebuttal of
the presumption of the husband's paternity. 39 The liberalizing
legislative change that suspended the time period 40 if the child
was born more than three hundred days after a continuous
physical separation of the mother and her husband4 1 was
incorporated into the Law Institute's revision. In addition, the
revision took an additional liberalizing step by converting what
42
was arguably a peremptive time period for instituting the action
into an explicitly 3prescriptive period, subject to both suspension
and interruption.4 Thus, the potential for more closely aligning
legal and biological paternity exists by virtue of the continued
liberalization of the rules regulating the disavowal action by the
36. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 cmt. (2006).
37. See infra app. B.
38. See Katherine Shaw Spaht & William Marshall Shaw, Jr., The Strongest
Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of
Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REv. 59 (1976).
39. See discussion of the recent history of the predecessor of Louisiana
Civil Code articles 189-90 in Trahan, supra note 4, at 411-16. See also Theresa
Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the MaritalPresumption
of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547 (2000).
40. Ordinarily, the time period for a disavowal action under Louisiana Civil
Code article 189 "commences to run from the day the husband learns or should
have learned of the birth of the child." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2006).
41. Id. ("Nevertheless, if the husband lived separate and apart from the
mother continuously during the three hundred days immediately preceding the
birth of the child, this prescription does not commence to run until the husband
is notified in writing that a party in interest has asserted that the husband is the
father of the child.").
42. See Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1979).
43.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2006). See also LA. Cv. CODE ANN. art.

189 (2006).
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husband and, for the first time, extending an action of
contestation to the mother of the child.
Nonetheless, liberalization in the pursuit of truth must be
tempered with profound concern for the effect of the alignment
on the child and the broader family, particularly if that alignment
is new. With the abundance of empirical data now available,
most if not all scholars agree that on average a child who is
reared in the home of his or her biological parents united in
marriage prospers in ways unattained by children reared in other
family structures. 44 These results obtain across a wide array of
social measurements, such as high school drop-out rates, teen
pregnancy, alcohol and drug experimentation, and criminal
behavior, to mention but a few. 45 Thus, a mother's unlimited
contestation action, which necessarily challenges the paternity of
her husband, would result in "bastardizing" her child and
severing the relationship between her former husband and the
child without regard to the length, depth, or quality of that
relationship. Potentially, the result of such a contestation action
could be to remove the child from what was at one time an intact
family and from the only father the child has ever known.
For these reasons, the legislature placed justifiable limitations
upon the exercise of the contestation action by the mother, each
of which focuses on the interest of the child. First, the mother
must rebut the presumption of her husband's paternity by clear
and convincing evidence,46 just as he must in a disavowal
action.47 Assertion of the action to contest her first husband's
paternity requires that the mother be married again and that the
second husband acknowledge the child as his.4w Second, if the
mother is successful in her contestation action, the result realigns
the legal 49paternity of the child consistently with biological
paternity. The probability of the second husband's paternity is
based initially upon his acts of marrying the mother and
44. Maggie Gallagher & Joshua Baker, Do Mothers and Fathers Matter?
The Social Science Evidence on Marriageand Child Well Being, iMAPP Policy
Brief (Feb. 27, 2004), http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/MothersFathers
Matter.pdf See also William Bradford Wilcox, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS:
TWENTY-SIX CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 2005).

45. Id. See also Can MarriedParentsPrevent Crime? Recent Research on
Family Structure and Delinquency 2000-2005 (Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.
marriagedebate.com/pdf/imapp.crimefamstructure.pdf.
46.
47.
48.
49.

LA. CIV.
LA. CIV.
LA. Cwv.
LA. CIV.

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

art.
art.
art.
art.

192 (2006).
187 (2006).
191 (2006).
194 (2006) ("A judgment shall not be rendered

decreeing that the former husband is the father of the child unless the judgment
also decrees that the present husband is the father of the child.").
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acknowledging the child as his, which, of course, the first
husband may challenge and seek to disprove. 5° Third, the
assertion of this action can occur only ifthe father is married to
the child's mother, the result being that the child would remain in
an intact marriedfamily.51 The mother may not contest the
paternity of her husband if the biological father is unwilling to
marry the mother or if the biological father is unknown. In other
words, the mother's contestation action ultimately may not
"bastardize" her child, for the child is considered by law to be the
child of her second husband.
Furthermore, in consideration of the emotional attachments
that a child and an adult can form, the contestation action may
only be brought within one hundred eighty days from the day the
mother and second husband married and within two years of the
child's birth.52 The time period is peremptive 53 and intended to
encourage a quick resolution of'the child's status and filiation
before emotional and psychological damage can occur to the
child through the severance of his attachment to a person who
cared for and nurtured him. 54 The provisions of the Revised
Statutes that implement the substantive legislation do, however,
permit the first husband to seek visitation with the child: "A
judgment rendered in favor of the mother terminates existing
child custody and visitation orders.
However, the former
husband in extraordinary circumstances may be granted
reasonable55visitation if the court finds it is in the best interest of
the child.,

50. Disproving the paternity of the second husband occurs most frequently
by the use of blood or tissue (DNA) testing as provided for in Louisiana Revised
Statutes Section 9:396. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:396 (2006).
51. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (b) (2006) ("The mother is
permitted to file the contestation action only if she seeks to establish the child's
paternity to her present husband. The restricted right of the mother to file an
action to contest her former husband's paternity serves to align more closely
biological and legal paternity in instances when the child's status will not be
adversely affected by the social stigma of birth outside of marriage if the action
is successful. In the situation contemplated by this Article, the mother's action
serves to establish legally the child as a member of an intact family, whose
stability is marked by the marriage of the mother and alleged father.").
52. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2006).
53. Id.
54. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 193 cmt. (2006).
55. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:403C(1) (as added by 2006 La. Acts No. 344,
§ 4) (emphasis added). Cf LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (2006).

2007]

NEW LA W OF FILIA TION

V. LEGITIMATION BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE BECOMES A
PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY

What had constituted legitimation by subsequent marriage
before 200556 creates a presumption of paternity under the new
If
revision.
If the child is otherwise unfiliated,58 which as a
condition to legitimation by subsequent marriage constitutes a
change in the law, 59 the man who marries the child's mother after
the child's birth 60 and acknowledges the child as his by authentic
act or by signing the birth certificate is presumed to be the father of
the child. 6 1 This newly created presumption can be rebutted just as
the presumption that applies to the husband of the mother of a
child conceived or born during the marriage. 62 Because this article
explicitly requires the concurrence of the mother and a formal
acknowledgment by the husband/father, 63 the time period during
which he may disavow his paternity is peremptive and short--one

56. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 cmt. (a) (2006) ("Former Article 198
recognized legitimation by subsequent marriage as a method of establishing
patemity.").
57. Id.("This Article establishes a new presumption of paternity that
corresponds to the circumstances of former Civil Code Article 198 (rev.
1979).").
58. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 cmt. (b) (2006) ("Furthermore, in a
contestation action brought by the mother under Articles 191-194 (rev. 2005),
the presumption does not apply and the mother must prove the paternity of her
present husband by clear and convincing evidence.").
59. Id. ("This Article creating a presumption does not apply if the child
born prior to the marriage is filiated to another man.").
60. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 195 cmt. (d) (2006) ("The presumption
created by this Article arises when, subsequent to the birth of a child, the mother
marries a man who formally acknowledges, or has acknowledged, the child as
his with the mother's concurrence." A child born during but conceived before
the marriage is presumed to be the child of the mother's husband at the time of
the child's birth.).
61. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 (2006) ("A man who marries the mother of
a child notfiliatedto another man and who, with the concurrence of the mother,
acknowledges the child by authentic act or by signing the birth certificate is
presumed to be the father of that child.") (emphasis added).
62. Id.("The husband may disavow paternity of the child as provided in
Article 187.").
63. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 cmt. (d) (2006) ("Prior law provided that a
child was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents if the child was
formally or informally acknowledged before or after the marriage. This Article
requires a formal acknowledgment, which may be made at any time. An
informal acknowledgment consisted of a writing not the equivalent of an
authentic act in which the father referred to the child as his, or conversations and
other similar conduct to the same effect.").

318

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

hundred eighty days from "the day of64 the marriage or the
acknowledgment, whichever occurs later."
In fact, the creation of a presumption that must be rebutted by a
father who marries the mother after the birth of the child and
acknowledges her with the mother's concurrence 65 strengthens the
position of the child under such circumstances. The presumed
father whose acts reflect the conviction that he is the father bears
the responsibility of disproving his paternity, rather than the child
bearing the responsibility of establishing the truth of all of the
facts-i.e., most importantly, that the man acknowledging him is
his biological father. 66 Just as in the case of the presumption that
the husband of the mother is the father of the child born during
marriage, a child "legitimated by subsequent marriage" enjoys
protection that other children born outside of wedlock do not. That
protection, which assumes by presumption that the husband is the
father in both cases, relies upon marriage to the mother as evidence
either of compliance by the husband with his positive obligation of
fidelity 67 or, in the latter case, of his belief confirmed by the
mother that he is the father of the child.
VI. FORMAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT AS A PRESUMPTION: DEPENDS
UPON AGE OF CHILD AND THE ISSUE LITIGATED

In a departure from prior law explored in greater detail
elsewhere in this issue, article 196 presumes that the man who
64. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 cmt. (c) (2006).
65. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 195 cmt. (e) (2006) ("The concurrence of the
mother required by this Article is a juridical act.").
66. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 cmt. (a) (2006) ("Former Article 198
recognized legitimation by subsequent marriage as a method of establishing
paternity. By creating a presumption of paternity under circumstances that
previously constituted legitimation by subsequent marriage, this Article
overrules such cases as Chatelain v. State, DOTD. . . and O'Brien v. O'Brien...
(father who signed birth certificate and married the mother was not presumed to
be father of child born before marriage).").
67. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 cmt. (b) (2006). Also, Louisiana Civil Code
article 185 assumes that the wife complied with her negative obligation of
fidelity, that is, not to have sexual intercourse with anyone other than her
husband. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2006).
68. Trahan, supra note 4. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 cmt. (b)
(2006) ("Under former Civil Code Article 203(B)(2) (rev. 1997), a presumption
of paternity was created only when there was an acknowledgment made by
signing of the registry of birth or baptism, and that presumption was explicitly
declared rebuttable by a mere preponderance of the evidence .... This Article
changes the law in that, under this revision, no presumption is created by signing
the baptismal registry."); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 cmt. (c) (2006) ("This
Article changes the law as to a child acknowledged by authentic act: it creates a
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acknowledges a child by authentic act or by signing the birth
certificate 6 9 is the father of the child, but only, as a general
proposition, if invoked by the child: "The presumption can be
invoked only on behalf of the child., 70 As a consequence, there is
no reference, as there is in the case of a child "legitimated by
subsequent marriage,"' to methods of rebutting the presumption.
As a Feneral rule, the presumption cannot be invoked by the
father 7 so it fails to operate in the same manner and with the same
strength73as the other two presumptions previously discussed in this
article:

The presumption created by this Article must be
distinguished from the presumptions under Sections 1 and 2
of this Chapter. There is no similar limitation in this
Section as to who may bring the action to rebut the
presumption created by this Article .... Likewise, there is
no time period during which an action to challenge the
presumption of this Article must be instituted.74
An exception to invocation of this presumption only by the
child exists in "custody, visitation, and child support cases.
The
2006 amendment to this Civil Code article, which was initially
revised in 2005, includes a comment that suggests the exception
provided for in cases of custody, visitation, and child support
involves only the "authentic act of acknowledgment," not
necessarily the birth certificate, 76 and affords to that

rebuttable presumption of paternity in favor of the child only, whereas former
Civil Code Article 203(B)(1) (rev. 1997) created "a legal finding of paternity"
but for limited purposes [child support only].").
69. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 196 cmt. (b) (2006) ("This Article changes the
law in that, under this revision, no presumption is created by signing the
baptismal registry.").
70. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 (2006).
71. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 cmt. (b) (2006).
72. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 cmt. (a) (2006) ("The man who executes
the acknowledgment or signs the birth certificate will not create a presumption
in his own favor that he is the father.") (emphasis added).
73. See discussion supranotes 19-28, 53-64.
74. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 cmt. (d) (2006).
75. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 (2006).
76. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:392, 392.1, 405, 406 (2006), amended by
2006 La. Acts No. 344, § 4. Despite the fact that in the "except" clause in
Louisiana Civil Code article 196 no such limitation appears, the substantive
provisions that elaborate on the exception, such as Louisiana Revised Statutes
Sections 9:392, 392.1, and, arguably, 405 limit the effect generally to
acknowledgments by authentic act. This argument may be made although
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acknowledgment "the effect of a legal finding of paternity in
compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 666."7 7 Reserving for later reference
the federal statute to which the comment refers, the most important
of the statutes addressing this exception provides that "[i]n child
support, custody, and visitation cases, the acknowledgment of
paternity by authentic act is deemed to be a legal finding of
paternity and is sufficient to establish an obligation to support the
without the necessity of obtaining a
child and to establish visitation
' 78
judgment of paternity.
Mandated by federal law for minor children whose "child
support" or whose custody or visitation is at issue, 79 the
acknowledment by authentic act constitutes a "legal finding of
Note that these are the sole issues for which the
paternity."
acknowledgment equals a legal finding of paternity: child support,
which is a term used to describe support for a minor child or
major child if extended under special circumstances, 82 and
custody 83 and visitation,8 4 which likewise85 by definition refer to
8
minor children. Thus, issues of inheritance and wrongful death,86
or support for a major descendant who is not entitled to "child
87
by the general rule
or its extension,
support"
be
maythat
formal acknowledgment
created byarea governed
the presumption

Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:405, unlike Section 9:392.1, does not
mention "acknowledgment of paternity by authentic act." See id. § 9:405.
77. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 cmt. (2006). The comment continues by
citing the relevant Louisiana statutes so providing: "For example, see the
provisions of R.S. 9:392, 392.1, 393, 400, 405, 406, R.S. 40:34(b)(1)(a)(iv) and
(h)(iv)." Id. The two most important of the provisions on effect are Louisiana
Revised Statutes Sections 9:392.1 and 9:405.
78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:392.1 (2006) (amended 2006). See also id.§
9:405.
79. See discussion infra Part VIII. See also infra app. C.
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:392.1 (2006) (amended 2006). Because of the
profound effect afforded to this acknowledgment, justified in part by the
procedure that precedes its execution (Louisiana Revised Statutes Section
9:392), and the fact that the two parties (mother and alleged father participate
together), the statutes provide a method for its revocation with and without
cause. See id.§ 9:406 (amended 2006). Cf LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 196 cmt.
(e) (1996) (amended 2006).
81. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 141-42 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:315.1-.20 (2006) (guidelines for determination of child support).
82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.22C-D (2006).
83. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 131-37 (2006).
84. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2006).
85. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 888, 1493 (2006).
86. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2 (2006).
87. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 229 (2006).
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invoked solely by the child. The father, who executes a selfserving act of formally acknowledging the child, cannot in such
circumstances create a presumption that he can invoke to inherit or
to recover for the wrongful death of the child. Clearly, the
language chosen to delineate specific issues that require proof of
the filiation of minor children means the general rule educated in
article 196 applies in cases involving major children8 8 and in cases
involving minor children where the issue does not concern "child
support," custody, or visitation. That general rule is that the
presumption created by a formal acknowledgment cannot be
invoked by the alleged father, only by the child.
VII. LIMITED RECOGNITION OF DUAL PATERNITY WHEN ASSERTED
BY THE FATHER

Of all the issues presented for deliberation by the Council of
the Law Institute that concerned filiation, the most contentious,
and the issue that produced the most vacillating results, was "dual
paternity." On six separate occasions, 89 the Council considered the
fundamental question of whether the law should permit a child to
have two legally recognized fathers, one of whom was the husband
of the mother when the child was conceived or born, often
reaching conflicting results. The issue posed each time was that in
Appendix B 90 to this article: Should the Louisiana Legislature ever
recognize that a child has two legal fathers, and, if so, under what
circumstances? After the decision rendered by the United States
Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,91 involving a
California statute, the Law Institute Council concluded that
denying the biological father of a child the right to establish his
filiation when another man was presumed to be the father was not
unconstitutional.92 Thus, the Council considered the full range of
88. There are two narrow exceptions that involve an extension of child
support awarded to a minor child.
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section
9:315.22C (extension of child support awarded to a minor until nineteen years of
age under certain circumstances) and Section 9:315.22D (extension of child
support awarded to a minor until twenty-two years of age if he has a
developmental disability). See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.22C (2006), and
id.§ 9:315.22D.
89. Minutes in which there is reference to the discussion and the resolution
of the issue of dual paternity are in the personal files of the author.
90. See infra app. B.
91. 491 U.S. 110(1989).
92. LA.CIv. CODE ANN.art. 197 cmt. (b)(2006)("Louisiana currently isthe
only state which recognizes that a child may establish his filiation to more than
one father. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the United States
Constitution did not prohibit a California statute from denying the biological
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legislative options in such cases, from legislative recognition for
the first time of "dual paternity" to abolition of the
jurisprudentially created phenomenon," and any and all legislative
solutions in between. For example, one solution arguably in
between was that "legal" paternity for both fathers did not
94
necessarily mean the concomitant legal rights and obligations.
Unsurprisingly, due to concern principally for the child, the
Council of the Law Institute and ultimately the legislature chose a
legislative solution in between the two obvious extremes as to
statutory recognition of a second legal father; but, if he was
recognized, the Council decided95he should have all the legal rights
and obligations of a legal father.
The revision of the paternity action instituted by the child and
96
the addition of the avowal action of the biological father
distinguishes, in the latter case, an action instituted when a child is
otherwise unfiliated and an action instituted when the child is
already filiated to another man. In the former case, the child may
institute the action at any time except for purposes of succession
only. 97 If the action is for purposes of succession, the applicable
peremptive period is one year, which commences to run from the
day of death of the alleged parent. 98 For the child, the rules

father such a right. See Michael H. v. Gerald D .... But see Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003), which does not directly concern the biological
father's right [to establish his paternity] but rejects part of the rationale of the
decision in the Michael H. case.").
93. See, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989); Griffin v.
Succession of Branch, 479 So. 2d 324 (La. 1985); Succession of Mitchell, 323
So. 2d 451 (La. 1975); Warren v. Richard, 283 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
aff'd, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
94. In Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 855 (La. 1989), the Louisiana
Supreme Court left open the question of whether both legally recognized fathers,
one biological and the other legally presumed, would always have the same
rights and obligations ("The question of whether the 'legal' father in this case
also shares the support obligation is not before the court. We decline for now to
hold the legal father will, in all factual contexts, be made to share the support
obligations with the biological father and the mother.").
95. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. (a) (2006) ("If the child establishes
paternity under this Article, all of the civil effects of filiation apply to both the
child and the father. Civil effects of filiation include the right to support, to
inherit intestate, and to sue for wrongful death.").
96. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 cmt. (a) (2006) ("Even before the
enactment of Article 191, the jurisprudence recognized the right of the father to
institute an avowal action as a predicate to, or simultaneous with, the exercising
of parental rights.").
97. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 (2006).
98. Id.
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applicable to the paternity action apply regardless of whether the
child is filiated or not. 99 However, the father's avowal action and
his right to institute it depend upon whether the child is filiated to
another man. If the child is unfiliated, the father may institute an
avowal action at any time except that "the action shall be instituted
no later than one year from the day of the death of the child."' 00
Note that the father's action is limited in ways that the child's
action is not, even if the child is unfiliated. As to the father's
action, the one-year peremptive period from day of death of the
child applies "in all cases," and, unlike the child's action, is not
0
limited to instances in which the issue is a succession matter.' '
Yet, the most salient distinction between the paternity and avowal
actions concerns the time period for instituting the action if the
child is otherwise filiated: the avowal action "shall be instituted
within one year from the day of the birth of the child" with a
narrow exception if the mother deceived the father as to his
paternity. 102 03The child, however, can institute the paternity action
at any time. 1
Obviously, the legislation that recognizes "dual paternity"
affords the child significantly greater rights than those afforded the
father in such situations. The comments explain why:
If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the
alleged father must institute his action within one year of
the child's birth, to which there is one exception. If the
child dies, the action must be instituted no later than one
year from the death of the child. These restrictions
imposed upon the alleged father's rights to institute the
avowal action recognize first, that state attempts to require
parents to conform to societal norms should be directed at
the parents, not the innocent child of the union (see Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459 (1977)), and
second, that a father who failed during a child's life to
assume his parental responsibilities should not be permitted
99. Id.("A child may institute an action to prove paternity, even though he
is presumed to be the child of another man ....
")(emphasis added).
100. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2006).
101. Id.
102. Id.("If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the action
shall be instituted within one year from the day of the birth of the child.
Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child regarding
his paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year from the day the
father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within ten years from the
day of the birth of the child, whichever first occurs.").
103. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 197 (2006).
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unlimited time to institute an action to benefit from the
child's death.l° 4
Another comment adds: "The time period of one year from the
child's birth imposed upon the alleged father if the child is
presumed to be the child of another man requires that the alleged
father act quickly to avow his biological paternity."' 10 5 Why must
the alleged father act quickly?
Requiring that the biological father institute the avowal
action quickly is intended to protect the child from the
upheaval of such litigation and its consequences in
circumstances where the child may actually live in an
existing intact family with his mother and presumed father
or may have become attached
over many years to the man
06
presumed to be his father.'
VIII. FEDERALIZATION OF FAMILY LAW
Although comment (g) to Civil Code article 198 states that the
time period during which the biological father must act if the child
is presumed to be that of another man does not apply to the
Department of Social Services "in accordance with 42 U.S.C.
666,"' 107 Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:404 now directs that
the time period contained in article 198 "shall apply to the
Department of Social Services. 1' 8 What a difference a year
makes in the interpretation by attorneys of the Administration for
Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services about the thrust of Civil Code article 198 (limited dual
paternity). They now accept the avowal action by the biological
father as a "disestablishment" rather than as an "establishment" of
paternity. 0 9 Thus, federal legislation does not require that
Louisiana law permit the biological father to "establish" his
paternity until the child is eighteen because his establishment
104. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 198 cmt. (d) (2006) (citation omitted).
105. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 cmt. (e) (2006).
106. Id.
107. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 cmt. (g) (2006) (emphasis added). The
comment cites Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:395.1 as authority, which
has been repealed by 2006 La. Acts No. 344, § 7.
108. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:404 (2006) (emphasis added).
109. Telephone conversation with Margot Bean, Attorney for ACF, A
Division of the Department of Health and Human Services (Feb. 24, 2006), in
response to Letter from Katherine Shaw Spaht to Wade Horn, Assistant
Secretary of Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services
(Feb. 21, 2006) (on file with author).
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would, in effect for their purposes, "disestablish" the paternity of
the husband of the mother even if that is not the result under
Louisiana law.
By contrast, if the "establishment" of paternity occurs by
acknowledgment of a child otherwise unfiliated to another man,
federal legislation requires that an acknowledgment executed under
the federally mandated circumstances of Louisiana Revised Statutes
hospital-based
Section
9:392
(which
implements
the
acknowledgment program) constitutes a "legal finding of
paternity."' r 0 This legal finding of paternity "is sufficient to
establish an obligation to support the child and to establish visitation
11
without the necessity of obtaining a judgment of paternity."''
Obviously, this legal treatment of an acknowledgment departs from
the general rule contained in article 196, which is that the
acknowledgment creates a presumption of paternity in favor of the
child only and has no effect, much less a legalfindingof paternity,
upon the father. Article 196 as amended in 2006 reflects this
exception, but is careful to narrowly limit that exception to the
mandatory requirements of federal law--that2 is, to litigation
involving custody, visitation, and child support."
Notice that by contrast to the provisions of article 196 enacted in
2005, these exceptions to the effect of an acknowledgment apply
whether the litigation is "handled by the Department of Social
Services" or not."T13 The exception applies to all litigants in custody,
visitation, and "child support" cases, which effectively means cases
in which custody and visitation or "child support" for a minor
child 1 14 is at issue. The use of "child support" as a term of art was
intended to limit the exception to only what is federally

110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:392.1 (2006).
111. Id.
112. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in
custody, visitation, and child support cases, the acknowledgment does not create
a presumption in favor of the man who acknowledges the child.").
113. Louisiana Civil Code article 196 as originally enacted in 2005 contained
a last sentence that read: "In those support and visitation cases handled by the
Department of Social Services, the acknowledgment is deemed to be a legal
finding of paternity and is sufficient to establish an obligation to support the
child and to establish visitation without the necessity of obtaining a judgment of
paternity." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 (2005) (amended 2006).
114. There are two exceptions to the limitation of the issue of "child support"
to minor children and those pertain to instances in which child support granted
to a minor is continued beyond minority. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.22C
(2006) (for dependent child in secondary school until nineteen years of age), and
id.§ 9:315.22D (for developmentally disabled child until twenty-two years of
age).
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mandated.11 5 Thus, the exception that makes an acknowledgment a
"legal finding of paternity" does not apply to litigation to enforce the
obligation to support a descendant who is a major imposed by Civil
Code article 229,116 much less to a wrongful death or succession
action. For all other issues related to a minor child and proof of his
filiation, an acknowledgment by the father does not even create a
presumption in his favor, although it does so in favor of the child. 'l7
Should the litigation concern the filiation of a major child, clearly
the exception does not apply. Furthermore, the acknowledgment
executed pursuant to the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes
Section 9:392 involves a specific procedure with the participation of
the notary and both parents.18 The participation of both parents
eliminates the policy objection to the exception that a father can
unilaterally execute an authentic act of acknowledgment for the
purpose of exercising rights, rather than incurring obligations, and
have it constitute a legal finding of paternity. In addition, another
reason for limiting the exception is that the legislation concerning
this type of acknowledgment and its effect as a legal finding of
paternity only provides for revocation by the father who executes
it 1 9- -- no explicit provision is made for challenging the truth of the
acknowledgment by other interested parties, including the child.
Limiting the effect of federal legislation on policy decisions
made by the State of Louisiana through its legislators represents the
115. Federal statutes only concern minor children, not major children.
Compare infra app. C, with infra note 116. Such support is referred to virtually
always as "child support." See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1 et seq.
116. LA. Cry. CODE ANN. art. 229 (2006) ("Children are bound to maintain
their father and mother and other ascendants who are in need, and the relatives
in the direct ascending line are likewise bound to maintain their needy
descendants, this obligation being reciprocal. This reciprocal obligation is
limited to life's basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, and health care, and
arises only upon proof of inability to obtain these necessities by other means or
from other sources.").
117. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 (2006). See also sources cited supra notes
70-72.
118. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 cmt. (2006) ("'Except as otherwise
provided' in this Article refers to other related statutes that give an authentic act
of acknowledgment, such as that contemplated by R.S. 392, the effect of a legal
finding of paternity in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 666. For example, see the
provisions of R.S. 9:392, 392.1, 393, 400, 405, 406, R.S. 40:34(B)(l)(a)(iv) and
(h)(iv)."). Arguably, Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:405 (as amended by
2006 La. Acts No. 344, § 4) should be interpreted to mean if the
acknowledgment is one executed under the authority of Louisiana Revised
Statutes Section 9:392 ("In child support, custody, and visitation cases, the
acknowledgment of paternity by authentic act is deemed to be a legal finding of
paternity and is sufficient to establish an obligation to support the child and to
establish visitation without the necessity of obtaining a judgment of paternity.").
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:206 (2006).
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outcome of many contentious, lengthy legal arguments with federal
officials at both the regional and national level (principally with
their attorneys) about the exact requirements under federal law and
whether Louisiana's statutes, as amended by Act of the Louisiana
Legislature No. 344 of 2006, would be in compliance. The contents
of Appendix C to this article represent one of the results of these
contentious arguments; Appendix C contains the pertinent federal
statutes and a reference to the Louisiana statutes that constitute
compliance with the federal mandates.' 20 In an attempt to protect
the State of Louisiana from adverse actions by the Department of
Health and Human Services, whose lawyers argued that the 2005
filiation revision did not comply with federal law, the amendments
to Louisiana Civil Code article 196 (acknowledgment) and Louisiana
Revised Statutes Section 9:392.1 (effect of acknowledgment in
accordance with hospital-based acknowledgment program) were
explicitly made retroactive.' 21
Complicating matters further,
Louisiana's Civil Code and the relationship of the Civil Code
Ancillaries to the Code typically confound attorneys from other
states, necessitating a basic lecture on the relationship between the
two bodies of law, including the fact that both are the law and the
Ancillaries supplement the Civil Code with more specific statutory
material, which is, of course, not superseded by the Civil Code.
What is most striking about this experience in the area of proof
of filiation is the extent to which, even in a Republican
administration, the federal government through legislation and
administrative rules has intruded into an area of law historically
reserved to the states. 122 This intrusion, which is both serious and
objectionable, should be particularly worrisome to Louisiana
officials and citizens because of the inflexibility of federal
bureaucracies and their lack of sensitivity to and understanding of a
civil law jurisdiction.
IX. CONCLUSION

Since the late 1970s Louisiana's law of filiation has reflected a
highly structured classification system based upon the circumstances
surrounding a child's conception and birth. That system was
substantially and permanently altered by constitutional decisions of
120. See infra app. C.
121. 2006 La. Acts No. 344, § 8 ("Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the provisions of Article 196 and R.S. 9:392.1 shall be retroactive
to June 29, 2005.").
122. For an excellent discussion of the federalization of state family law, see
Jill Elain Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 825, 870-97
(2004).
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both the United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts. The Civil
Code articles failed to reflect the result of those decisions, that is,
that the highly structured classification system represented nothing
more than different methods of establishing paternity. Piecemeal
legislation attempted to add some order to and recognition of the
significant changes wrought by the decisions, but the entire body of
law related to proof of filiation desperately needed revision and
coherence.
Furthermore, scientific advances in assisted reproduction altered
the understanding not only of paternity but also, and even more
fundamentally, of maternity. Occasionally, by specific legislation
narrowly tailored to a particular set of circumstances, these scientific
advances were acknowledged.123 Much work remains to be done if
there is to be a comprehensive recognition of legal issues prompted
by assisted reproduction, issues which focus on identification of the
parents and regulation of the medical procedures. These legal issues
involve sensitive and enormously important policy matters which
thus far the legislature has been reluctant to address. The scientific
and medical communities in the United States and Louisiana
generally prefer to remain unregulated and free of constraint in their
desire to advance scientific knowledge and practice in the service of
patients.
The legislative revision of the law of filiation accomplished in
2005 and further implemented by legislation in 2006 did improve
the coherence of the law and does reflect more accurately its
current state. Important policy issues underlying decisions made in
the revision process, issues as fundamental as whether Louisiana
should retain the presumption that the husband of the mother is the
father of the child conceived or born during marriage, were
explored and resolved systematically. Nonetheless, time waits for
no man (or woman) and for no revision of the law, so issues of
assisted reproduction remain largely unresolved and the procedures
To that extent, the revision is less than
unregulated.
comprehensive. As troubling as the unresolved issues of assisted
conception are, the extent of federal intrusion into state family law
revealed by response to the revision process poses more serious
concerns for the immediate future. That federal intrusion is one
more example of good intentions (protection of children) gone
awry. As to the future, Louisiana should address the issues of

123. See comment (c) to Louisiana Civil Code article 184, which cites as
specific exceptions to the definition of maternity, Louisiana Revised Statutes
Sections 9:121-33 (in vitro fertilization statute), 40:32, 40:34(B)(1)(h)(v) and
(B)(1)(j) (gestational surrogacy, gamete providers as parents).
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124
assisted reproduction as the Task Force reports in Appendix A
suggest and continue to monitor and oppose any further federal
intervention into the law of Louisiana families.

124. See infra app. A.
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APPENDIX A
Report of the Task Force on Assisted Conception
CHARGE OF THE TASK FORCE
Louisiana Senate

Concurrent Resolution No.

141--BE

IT

RESOLVED that the Legislature 'of Louisiana does hereby create a task
force to study the impact of assisted conception and artificial means of
reproduction relative to state laws.
I. ASSISTED INSEMINATION

A. Existing law:
Louisiana Civil Code (La. C.C.)
paternity of husband

Article 184.

Presumed

The husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of all
children born or conceived during the marriage.
La. C.C. Art. 188. Husband's loss of right to disavowal
...The

husband also cannot disavow paternity of a child born as

a result of artificial insemination of the mother to which he
consented.

B. Considerations: Should there be more specific regulation?
1. Consent--Should a particular form of consent be required?
Must it be in writing? What result if the consent is not in proper
form? How long does the consent last? Can it be revoked?
a. Recommendations of Louisiana State Law Institute
Marriage-PersonsCommittee (See document prepared
by Professor Katherine S. Spaht for Meeting of the

Committee on January 30, 1998.)
1. Form. The writing may be act under private
signature.
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2. Sample Form. A sample consent form will
be provided for in the Revised Statutes. It is
valid as long as in substantial compliance, like
the statutory will (R.S. 9:2442).
3. Content. Language in the form should state
that the husband agrees that he will be the father
of the child conceived by assisted conception
and that he has no right to bring a disavowal
action. Should we have an affirmative statement
that the husband shall be the natural father or is
it enough to deny him the right to disavow?
NOTE: Essence of the statements to be included
in the form is that the husband assumes the legal
responsibility of the father, therefore it may be
enough to simply deny him the right to disavow.
4. Time of Consent and Duration. The consent
of the husband must be dated within seven days
of the procedure. The consent is irrevocable for
a period not to exceed one hundred eighty days,
unless the act of consent provides for a shorter
period.
5. Revocation. The consent is automatically
revoked upon divorce or death, unless the
husband expressed a contrary intent in the act of
consent. However, a child may use the consent
in a paternity action for a period of two years
after the death of the husband. Sample statute
from Virginia is in Appendix of document.
b. Uniform ParentageAct (UPA) (2000) (Approved and
recommended for enactment in all the states at the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, July 28 - August 4, 2000)

Section 704. Consent to Assisted Reproduction.
(a) A consent to assisted reproduction by a married
woman must be in a record signed by the woman and her
husband.
The requirement does not apply to the

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

donation of eggs for assisted reproduction by another
woman.
(b) Failure of the husband to sign a consent required
by subsection (a), before or after birth of the child, does
not preclude a finding that the husband is the father of a
child born to his wife if the wife and husband openly
treated the child as their own.
c. Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act Draft
(December 1999) (Draft prepared by ABA Family Law
Section's Committee on Reproductive and Genetic
Technology - not yet endorsed)
1.06A Parenthood
Subd. 2. Intended parent(s) who execute a written
agreement shall be the parent(s) of a child conceived
through assisted conception.
2. Rights and responsibilities of donor. What regulation is
necessary with regard to the relationship of the donor to the
child? Should we clearly define a donor?
a. USCACA (1988)
Sec. 1. Definitions
(2) "Donor" means an individual [other than a
surrogate] who produces egg or sperm used for assisted
conception, whether or not a payment is made for the
egg or sperm used, but does not include a woman who
gives birth to a resulting child.
b. UPA (2000)
Section 102. Definitions
(8) "Donor" means an individual who produces eggs
or sperm used for assisted reproduction, whether or not
for consideration. The term does not include:
(A) a husband who provides sperm, or a wife who
provides eggs, to be used for assisted reproduction by
the wife; or
(B) a woman who gives birth to a child by means of
assisted reproduction [except as otherwise provided in
{Article} 8].
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c. Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act Draft
(December 1999) (notyet endorsed by ABA)
1,01 Definitions
Subd. 8. "Donor" means an individual, not an
intended parent, who provides egg, sperm, or embryo
used for assisted conception.
Should we state that he/she is not a parent?
a. USCA CA (1988)
Sec. 4 ParentalStatus of Donors andDeceasedIndividuals
[Except as otherwise provided in Sections 5 through
9 {Surrogacy Agreements}]:
(a) A donor is not a parent of a child conceived through assisted
conception.
UPA Section 702. ParentalStatus of Donor
A donor is not a parent of a child conceived through
means of assisted reproduction.
b. Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act Draft (not yet
endorsedby the ABA)
1.0 7 Inheritance
Subd. 2. A child resulting from assisted conception
is not an heir of a donor.
Subd. 3. A donor has no rights against the child or
the child's estate.
Should we provide for a procedure for waiver of his rights?
a. Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act Draft (not yet
endorsed by the ABA)
1.06A Parenthood
Subd. 3. Upon execution of a written document at
the time of donation of gamete(s) or embryo(s), the
donor(s) relinquish all rights, responsibilities, interests
and control over those gametes or embryos.
Subd. 4. A donor who executes a written agreement
is not a parent of a child conceived through the use of his
or her gamete(s) or embryo(s).
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3. Possible exceptionfor insemination of an unmarriedwoman.
Should the law make a distinction between insemination of a
married woman, as opposed to an unmarried woman? In the
former case, with the husband assuming the parental role, the
child would have two parents. In the case of an unmarried
woman, that may not be the case.
Should the central
consideration be that the child have two parents, if possible?

III. SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
A. Genetic/gestational
1. Existing law:
La. R..S. 9:2 713. Contractfor surrogatemotherhood; nullity
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined
herein shall be absolutely null and shall be void and
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood" means any
agreement whereby a person not married to the
contributor of the sperm agreed for valuable
consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting
fetus to birth, and then to relinquish to the contributor of
the sperm the custody and all rights and obligation to the
child. [Emphasis added.]
2. Considerations: The statute refers to compensated agreements.
Should the agreements be recognized if no compensation was paid?
B. Gestational
1. Existing law:
La. R.S. 40:32. Definition of terms
As used in this Chapter, the following terms shall
have the meanings ascribed to them in this Section
unless otherwise provided for or unless the context
otherwise indicates:
(1) "Biological parents" means a husband and wife,
joined by legal marriage recognized as valid in this state,
who provide sperm and egg for in vitro fertilization,
performed by a licensed physician, where the resulting
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fetus is carried and delivered by a surrogate birth parent
who is a blood relative of either the husband or wife.
[Emphasis added.]
La. R.S. 40:34. Vital recordsforms
B.(l) Contents of birth certificate. The certificate of
birth shall contain, as a minimum, the following items:
(a) Full name of child
(viii) In the case of a child born of a surrogate birth
parent who is a blood relative of a biological parent, the
surname of the child's biological parents shall be the
surname of the child.

(h)
(v) In the case of a child born of a surrogate birth
parent who is a blood relative of a biological parent, the
full name of the biological parent who is proven to be
the father by DNA testing shall be listed as the father.
(i) Maiden name of mother; however, if the child
born of a surrogate birth parent who is a blood relative
of a biological parent, the maiden name of the biological
parent who is proven to be the mother by DNA testing
shall be listed as the mother and the name of the
surrogate birth parent is not required.
(j) In the case of a child born of a surrogate birth
parent who is a blood relative of a biological parent, the
biological parents proven to be the mother and father by
DNA testing shall be considered the parents of the child.
2. Considerations: Louisiana law is silent as to gestational
surrogacy
agreements
between non-relatives,
whether
compensated or not.
The statute recognizes gestational
surrogacy agreements to some extent. In the case where the birth
mother is a blood relative of the genetic father or mother, the
genetic mother is relieved from having to adopt the child in order
to be recognized as the child's mother.
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What if there is a dispute between the birth mother and the
genetic mother? What if there is no dispute between the birth
and gestational mothers, as they both agree to share the rights
and responsibilities of motherhood? How shall we define
mother?
a. UPA. Recognizing the highly controversial nature of
gestational agreements, whether genetic/gestational or
purely gestational, the Drafting Committee of the UPA,
included the following Introductory Note to its article on
gestational agreements:
The subject of gestational agreements was last
addressed by the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1989 with the adoption of the
Uniform State of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA). That Act offers two alternatives on the
subject: to regulate such activities through a judicial
review process or to void such contracts. Only two
states have adopted either version of the Act; Virginia
chose to regulate such agreements, while North Dakota
opted to void them.
The Drafting Committee recognizes that there are
strongly held differences on this subject. Nonetheless,
the Committee has concluded that the advances of
science and the wide use of such reproductive
agreements virtually demand that provisions for judicial
supervision of gestational agreements be enacted. For
this reason, Article 8 is included as an option in the Act.
However, the Committee includes this article without a
recommendation either for or against its adoption. The
Uniform Parentage Act, as revised, contains too many
important changes to jeopardize its passage because of
opposition to this article. If the inclusion of Article 8 is
so controversial in a state considering adoption of this
Act to cause a risk of failure, the article may be omitted
entirely.
References to Article 8 appear in brackets throughout the act.
Section 102. Definitions
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[(11) "Gestational mother" means the woman who gives birth to a
child.]
Section 201. Establishmentof Parent-ChildRelationship
(a) The mother-child relationship is established
between a child and a woman by:
(1) the woman's having given birth to the child
[except as otherwise provided in {Article} 8];
(2) an adjudication of the woman's maternity; [or]
(3) adoption of the child by the woman; [or]
(4) an adjudication confirming the woman as a
parent of a child born pursuant to a gestational
agreement validated under [Article] 8 or other
enforceable gestational agreement.]
b.
Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act (not yet
endorsed by the ABA)
1.06B GestationalAgreements
Subd. 1. A gestational carrier is not the parent of the
child whom she gestates for the intended parent(s).
Subd. 2. If a gestational carrier is married, her
spouse is not the parent of the child whom she gestates
for intended parent(s).
1.07 Inheritance
Subd. A. In the absence of a testamentary document
executed by an intended parent, the following principles
apply:
(b) If one or both intended parents dies at any time during the
pregnancy of a gestational carrier, the resulting child is an heir of both
intended parents.
3. Gestational surrogacy with donor eggs: If we opt to recognize the
concept of "intended parents," how far should we go? Consider the case
of In re Buzzanca, 61 Cal.App. 4b 1410, 72 Cal. Rptr 2d 280 in which a
divorcing husband and wife were held to be the lawful parents of a child
who was biologically unrelated to them, but whose birth resulted from a
surrogacy agreement entered into by the husband and wife, using a donor
egg.
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IV. EGG DONATION
A. Existing law:
La. R.S. 9:122. Uses of human embryo in vitro
... The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human ovum, or human
embryo is expressly prohibited.
B. Considerations: Although prohibiting the sale of human eggs, the
law in Louisiana is silent as to the donation, without
compensation, of human eggs. What is the status of an egg
donor with respect to the child? Should the same rules relative
to donors of sperm apply to the donors of eggs? (See Section on
Assisted Insemination.)
V. EMBRYO DONATION
A. Existing law:
La. R.S. 9:122. Uses of human embryo in vitro
... The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human ovum,
or human embryo is expressly prohibited.
La. R.S. 9:130. Duties of donors
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person
which cannot be owned by the in vitro fertilization
patients who owe it a high duty of care and prudent
administration. If the in vitro fertilization patients
renounce, by notarial act, their parental rights for in
utero implantation, then the in vitro fertilized human
ovum shall be available for adoptive implantation in
accordance with written procedures of the facility where
it is housed or stored. The in vitro fertilization patients
may renounce their parental rights in favor of another
married couple, but only if the other couple is willing
and able to receive the in vitro fertilized ovum. No
compensation shall be paid or received by either couple
to renounce parental rights. Constructive fulfillment of
the statutory provisions for adoption in this state shall
occur when a married couple executes a notarial act of
adoption of the in vitro fertilized ovum and birth occurs.
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La. R.S. 9:133. Inheritance rights
Inheritance rights will not flow to the in vitro fertilized
ovum as a juridical person, unless the in vitro fertilized
ovum develops into an unborn child that is born in a live
birth, or at any other time when rights attach to an
unborn child in accordance with law. As a juridical
person, the embryo or child born as a result of in vitro
fertilization and in vitro fertilized ovum donation to
another couple does not retain its inheritance rights from
the in vitro fertilization patients.
B. Considerations: The existing law prohibits the sale of human
embryos and provides for a type of pre-natal adoption for one
married couple to another. The statute clarifies that the child
born would not retain inheritance rights to the original couple
whose egg and sperm were used for the creation of the embryo.

VI. POSTHUMOUS CHILDREN
A. Existing law:
La. C.C. 26. Unborn child
An unborn child shall be considered as a natural person for
whatever relates to its interests from the moment of conception...
La. C.C. 939. Existence of successor
A successor must exist at the death of the decedent.
La. C.C. 940. Same; unborn child
An unborn child conceived after the death of the decedent and
thereafter born alive shall be considered to exist at the death of
the decedent.
La. C.C. 1474. Unborn children, capacity to receive
To be capable of receiving by donation inter vivos, an unborn
child must be in utero at the time the donation is made. To be
capable of receiving by donation mortis causa, an unborn child
must be in utero at the time of the death of the testator. In either
case, the donation has effect only if the child is born alive.
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La. R.S. 14:101.2. Unauthorizeduse of sperm, ovum, or embryo
A. No person shall knowingly use a sperm, ovum, or
embryo, through the use of assisted reproduction
technology, for any purpose other than that indicated by
the sperm, ovum, or embryo provider's signature on a
written consent form.
B. No person shall knowingly implant a sperm, ovum,
or embryo, through the use of assisted reproduction
technology, into a recipient who is not the sperm, ovum,
or embryo provider, without the signed written consent
of the sperm, ovum, or embryo provider and recipient.
C. Knowing violation of the provisions of this Section
shall be grounds for immediate revocation of the
violator's professional license.
D. This Section shall not apply to the use by a surviving
spouse of the human ova or sperm of the deceased
spouse in order to conceive a child, provided that prior
to his death the deceased spouse signed a consent form
authorizing such a donation.
B. Considerations: The Civil Code has always recognized the rights of
a posthumously born child to inherit from his father. With the
advent of new reproductive technology, questions regarding the
right of posthumously implanted and posthumously conceived
children arise.
Some posit, considering fertilization and
conception to be the same, that if fertilization takes place prior to
the death of the persons supplying the egg and the sperm, then a
child of that fertilization is considered in existence at the time of
conception, if later born alive and capable of inheriting; while
conceding that existing law would preclude such a child from
receiving donations if the embryo was not in utero at the time of
the alleged parent's death.
However, a child who was not conceived until after the parent's
death would be incapable of receiving, even intestate. Yet, the
Criminal Code does not prohibit the use of ova or sperm by a
surviving spouse after the death of the other spouse, if the
deceased spouse signed a consent form authorizing such a
donation. Should the resulting child in such a case be granted
inheritance rights? What if no consent form was signed by the
decedent? Although the spouse might be subject to sanctions,
should the child be deprived of inheritance rights?
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1. USCA CA (2000)
Sec. 4. ParentalStatus of Donors andDeceasedIndividuals
(b) An individual who dies before
implantation of an embryo, or before a child is
conceived other than through sexual intercourse,
using the individual's egg or sperm, is not a
parent of the resulting child.
Comment- . . . Section 4(b) is the only
provision of the Act which would deal with
procreation by those who are married to each
other. It is designed to avoid the problems of
intestate succession which could arise if the
posthumous use of a person's genetic material
could lead to the deceased being termed a
parent. Of course, those who want to explicitly
provide for such children in their will may do so.
[Emphasis added.]
2. UPA
Sec. 707. ParentalStatus of DeceasedSpouse
If a spouse dies before placement of
eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased spouse
is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after death,
the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child.
3. Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act (not endorsedyet
by the ABA)
1. 02 Informed Consent, Written Agreements and Confidentiality
Subd. 6. It shall be unlawful to collect
gametes or embryos from a deceased person for
any reason, without a written testamentary
document executed by an intended parent
pursuant to section 1.07 of this Act.
1.07 Inheritance
Subd. 1.
In the absence of a
testamentary document executed by an intended
parent, the following principles apply:
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(a) If an intended parent dies before
embryo transfer, the resulting child has no rights
against the state of that intended parent.
(c) If an intended parent dies after
storage of gametes or embryo(s), then the
resulting child is not the heir of the deceased
intended parent.
(d) If one or both intended parents dies
after the transfer of an embryo(s) or gametes, but
before the birth of the child, the resulting child is
an heir of both intended parents.
4.In re Estate of Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593, 753 A.2d 1257
(2000)
Twin girls were conceived in vitro
almost eighteen months after the death of
William Kolacy, with the sperm he had stored
prior to his death with the intent that his wife
bear children after his death. The court held the
state law which allowed children conceived
before death of father, but born after the death,
to inherit, unconstitutional in its discrimination
against posthumously conceived children.
Noting that the statute had been adopted without
thought to the situation presented, the court
reasoned that the general intent was to provide
for posthumously born children and thus granted
inheritance rights to the twins.
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Minority Report: Task Force on Assisted Conception
and Artificial Means of Reproduction
I. INTRODUCTION

A minority of the members of the Task Force on Assisted
Conception and Artificial Means of Reproduction dissents from
two recommendations contained in the report submitted on behalf
of the Task Force by Vice Chairman, Kathryn Venturatos Lorio.
They are:
1. Recommendation No. 5: "All legal relations between the
sperm donor and the child should be severed when an unmarried
woman is inseminated,absent an agreement by the partiesprior to
the procedure,to the contrary."
2. Recommendation No. 7: "Gestational surrogacy contracts
whereby one woman agrees,for valuable consideration, to carry
and give birth to a child created with the genetic material of
another woman, should be enforceable when medical reasons
preclude the woman who provides the egg to carry or bear the
child. In such cases, the egg provider should be presumed to be
the mother of the child."
Recommendation No. 5 received a Task Force vote of 7-5
(actually 6-4 by appointed members of the Task Force), and
Recommendation No. 7 received a Task Force vote of 8-4. For the
following express reasons a minority of the Task Force urge a
rejection of the two aforementioned proposals and instead provide
that the sperm donor is the father of a child born as the result of
artificial insemination of an unmarried woman and that gestational
surrogacy contracts for valuable consideration (pay) are
unenforceable.
II. RECOMMENDATION No. 5
All legal relations between the sperm donor should be severed
when an unmarriedwoman is inseminated,absent an agreement by
the partiespriorto the procedure, to the contrary.
Why we are opposed to this recommendation:
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A. "Our legal system grants no parent, male orfemale, the right
to be a sole parent."
1. Children conceived naturally by sexual intercourse between
a male and a female create two parents. Even in the case of
adoption by a single person which Louisiana law permits, (1)
adoption is no right and requires court approval after extremely
careful screening and (2) such adoptions, which constitute the
exception to the proposition stated italics, are intended to provide
for a child already born and in this world who needs any sort of
stable home.
2. "Children of divorced and never-married parents may well
experience parental absence, but they nonetheless can claim two
parents and two sets of biological relatives-grandparents, uncles,
aunts, cousins-whom they can identify as family and with whom
they may establish ties."
3. To grant to a woman the right to bear a child without a
father encourages the widespread cultural impression, fueled by
scholars in the field of law and economics and a hyper market
economy, that children are like consumer products and that "if you
want one you can buy one." Such an outlook, increasingly
pervasive in this country, is extremely damaging to children and
their need for adults to be child-centered, rather than individually
concerned with "their rights" and entitlements. This is particularly
true for feminists for whom bearing a child is most often referred
to as a "right."
B. All social science evidence confirms that on average a child
reared in a two-parent home fares far better than a child who is
reared in a single-parent home, and state and national
policymakers now recognize and incorporate this consistent
finding in state and nationalpolicy.
1. Outcomes for children in a single parent family: They are
"more likely, and in many instances far more likely, to die young,
to live in poverty, to be on welfare, to perpetuate a crime, to
commit suicide, to drop out of the labor force, to leave school, and
to have illegitimate children themselves. Seventy percent of
America's adolescent murderers, and of America's long-term
prisoners, come from fatherless homes."
2. In Louisiana during 2000, 45% of children were born out of
wedlock. [By 2002, 46.3% were born out of wedlock.]
3. In the 1996 Welfare Reform Act state monetary savings
from the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Act (TANF)
were to be used for four purposes, and two of those purposes were
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to promote the creation of two-parent families among those
receiving this welfare assistance and to encourage marriage. In the
re-authorization of the Welfare Reform Act scheduled for debate
when Congress convenes in 2002 it is expected that the
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Children and
Families will insist upon emphasizing these two goals.
4. To permit a woman with sufficient means to be
inseminated with the sperm of a donor whose legal relationship to
the child is severed is to discriminate against the poor woman
whose only means to bear a child is sexual intercourse with a man.
She is denied the option of bearing and rearing a child without
"interference" and "participation" by a father if he so chooses.
C. It is reasonable to distinguish permitting a single person to
adopt and denying a single person the right to be inseminated by
sperm from a person whose legal relationship with the child is
severed.
The state has to be concerned with children already born and
living in situations in which the parent desires to surrender the
child because she cannot responsibly care for him or the parent has
been abusive or neglectful. To assure that there is a sufficient pool
of prospective adoptive parents to care for and nurture children
already brought into the world, it is reasonable for the State of
Louisiana to permit single persons to adopt. "Adoption agencies
seek to ensure that children continue to enjoy the care of two
parents, allowing single-parent adoptions only in the case of hardto-place children who are otherwise unlikely to be adopted at all."
Quite to the contrary, the State of Louisiana has a very
important interest in promoting and encouraging two-parent
involvement in the lives of their children and to prevent the
purposeful, intentional creation of a child for life in an
environment that we know is not the ideal.
. . . it is often said these days that the private sexual
behavior of two people [or one person and a sperm donor]
is of no legitimate interest to the wider community, and if a
couple [unmarried woman] has a child out of wedlock, that
is nobody's business but their own. Clearly, that is not so.
Illegitimacy and fatherlessness have costly consequences,
being linked, as we have seen, to infant mortality, crime,
joblessness, homelessness, educational failure, and the
disintegration of whole neighborhoods.
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D. Distinguishingbetween the right of a marriedwoman and that
of an unmarried woman to be inseminated with the sperm of a
donor whose rights are severed is constitutional.
In the majority report the case of Eisenstadt v. Bairdis cited as
authority for the proposition that there are "constitutional concerns
about restricting procreative liberties of the unmarried." The right
described in the Eisenstadt case is the right "married or single" to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."
(Due process clause of the United States
Constitution, "the right to privacy")
1. Understanding this "right" and its parameters determines
whether an unmarried woman is entitled without any governmental
regulation to bear a child without a legally responsible father.
Rights so recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution are those recognized as deeply rooted in our country's
history and culture, according to two 1980s United States Supreme
Court opinions. Nothing suggests that the right of an unmarried
woman to bear a child without a legally responsible father is such a
right. Instead, our legal tradition has thus far followed a more
moderate approach, "which allows states considerable latitude both
"in regulating technological conception and in defining the status
of participants."
2. Furthermore, the Eisenstadt case recognized that the
intrusion by the government must be unwarranted and must so
fundamentally affect the person's decision that the state statute
implicates the Fourteenth Amendment. The intrusion is warranted
because of what we now know and understand about the
consequences for children reared in single-parent homes which
necessarily implicate the public interest. Secondly, the proposal of
the minority of the Task Force does not "fundamentally affect the
person's decision" because the minority report does not
recommend proscribing single women from artificial insemination,
which some countries do, but instead simply recommends that the
rights and obligations of the sperm donor NOT be severed. How
can such a state statute maintaining the legal rights of the genetic
father of the child be "fundamentally" affecting the decision of the
unmarried woman? In no other situation is an unmarried or
married woman for that matter given the choice of conceiving,
bearing and rearing a child without a potential legal father. She is
clearly able to make the decision to bear the child and like every
other would-be parent would not be legally entitled to parent alone.
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E. We are not persuadedby the argument thatfailing to sever the
sperm donor's rights as father to a child born as the result of the
insemination of an unmarried woman would reduce single
women's reproductive options available through adoption or
sexual intercoursewith a man.
1. "The fact that donor responsibility would likely reduce the
numbers of both donors and users is not a sufficient reason to
absolve donors of parental responsibility.. .Women who want to
parent alone would undoubtedly find unprotected sexual
intercourse more attractive and have a wider choice of sexual
partners if men who fathered children sexually could forgo
parental rights and responsibilities. But parentage law and policy
has firmly opposed such an expansion of parenting possibilities.
And while respect for procreative liberties suggests that
government should not counter-mand the decision to bear a child,
it hardly mandates state acquiescence in one parent's wish to deny
the existence of the other."
2. "There is simply no logical basis for a one-parentpolicy
applicable only to single AID users. The only interests ultimately
served by such a policy are those of the single woman who wants a
child but does not want that child to have afather."
Recommendation No. 5: All legal relations between the sperm
donor and the child should be maintained when an unmarried
woman is inseminated
III. RECOMMENDATION No. 7
Gestational surrogacy contracts whereby one woman agrees,
for valuable consideration, to carry and give birth to a child
created with the genetic material of another woman, should be
enforceable when medical reasons preclude the woman who
provides the egg to carry or bear the child. In such cases, the egg
providershould be presumed to be the mother of the child.
A minority of the Task Force opposed this recommendation
which for the first time in Louisiana legal history, if adopted,
would permit an enforceable agreement for payment for surrogacy,
although admittedly for gestational surrogacy only and only when
the egg donor is precluded for medical reasons from carrying or
bearing the child.
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A. The recommendation breaches the hitherto unbreachedsacred
notion that any part of childbearingis not for sale and in the case
of gestationalsurrogacy, that a woman 's womb is not for rent.
A minority of the Task Force believed that adoption of this
recommendation would violate ethical, moral and religious
boundaries to the effect that human body parts are not for sale or
rent. They are in the language of the civil law-extrapatrimonial,
too personal to be considered property-which inferentially this
recommendation does. In the same way Recommendation No. 5
encourages the notion that children are commodities, nothing more
than consumer products in the view of some scholars of law and
economics, and this recommendation recognizes that the human
body itself is a consumer product. Some scholars refer to this
phenomena as the "commodification" of the human being. Is
nothing sacred and beyond the reach of market activity?
B. The recommendation will permit the exploitation of poor
women in need of money by other women who for "medical"
reasons are "'precluded-fromcarryingthe child.
One member of the minority expressed passionately his
concern that the most likely victim of this recommendation would
be the poor women of this state. In some instances desperate for
money for their own families, their bodies would be hired out for
this most intimate of tasks to be performed for another woman of
means who is precluded from carrying the child.
Of course, the "medical" reason precluding the "renter" from
carrying the child could be emotional, mental, or psychological, as
well as physical which is clear from use of the word "preclude"
which is not the equivalent of "physically cannot." The range of
possibilities that exists which would qualify to preclude the
"renter" from bearing the child include severe inconvenience
(emotional or psychological) and if a surrogate was used under
those circumstances would preclude one of the natural purposes for
a nine-month gestation period-bonding with the fetus. Thus, the
fetus in such a scenario becomes a product produced by the
participation of an incubator-closer to the notion of any other
product that often requires a producer and distributor.
Recommendation No. 7 should be rejected. The Revised
Statutes recognize the possibility of gestationalsurrogacyas long
as there is no "valuable consideration," as when a family member
volunteers to serve as a gestationalsurrogate.
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APPENDIX B
Filiation Policy Issues to be Resolved by the Council
of the Institute
The Persons Committee requests the Council's direction on the
following related policy issues involving the law of filiation, (more
particularly the presumption of paternity of the husband of the
mother):
Should the legislation of Louisiana:
(1) Overrulepresent Louisianajurisprudenceand refuse to
recognize dual paternity in instances where the
presumption of paternity applies to the husband of the
mother; or
(2) Codify the present Louisiana jurisprudence by
recognizing dual paternity where the presumption applies
to the husbandof the mother?
If the decision of the Council is the latter of the two choices:
should the legislation distinguish the right of the child to establish
paternityfor the purpose of imposing obligations upon the father,
from the right of thefather to establishpaternityfor the purpose of
exercising rightspertainingto the child?
For example, should the legislation deny to the father, one who
committed adultery with the mother, any "rights" vis-a-vis the
child? Would such a distinction be constitutional under the equal
protection clauses of both the U.S. Constitution and Louisiana
Constitution?
Would denial of "rights" to the father, but
imposition of obligations constitute a denial of due process under
both the U.S. Constitution and Louisiana Constitution?
Interestingly enough, the interpretation of the Louisiana
constitutional guarantees may present greater obstacles to such a
distinction than the parallel guarantees in the U.S. Constitution.
LouisianaJurisprudence
Dual paternity, the possibility that a child may have two fathers
recognized by the law, exists under present Louisiana
jurisprudence. Dual paternity occurs in instances where the law
presumes that the husband of the mother is the father of her child
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(legal father) yet despite that presumption, the child and/or the
biological father is permitted to establish that someone else is the
actual father. As early as Succession of Mitchell, 323 So.2d 451
(La. 1975), the jurisprudence permitted proof that the wife's
second husband was the biological father of the children even
though the husband of the mother had not disavowed the children
(Civil Code articles 184-190). See also, Warren v. Richard, 296
So.2d 813 (La. 1974). Later cases were to the same effect and not
limited to the peculiar language of Civil Code Article 198
(legitimation by subsequent marriage), which was the particular
factual pattern in Mitchell. See Spaht and Shaw, The Strongest
PresumptionChallenged,37 La. L. Rev. 59 (1977).
In 1980 and again in 1981 Civil Code articles 208 and 209
were amended to place limitations upon the action to establish
filiation; limitations in the form of a peremptive period, burden of
proof, and, as reflected by the legislative history, the children who
were permitted to bring such an action. The last act containing the
amendments to both articles was recommended to the Legislature
by the Law Institute. The language of Civil Code articles 208 and
209 was intended to deny to the child who enjoyed legitimate
filiation the right to establish filiation to one other than the
husband of the mother. See Civil Code arts. 208, 209. Evidence of
this intention came in the form of an amendment to La. R.S.
46:236.1 F (Child Support Enforcement Program--AFDC), which
explicitly permitted the Department of Health and Human
Resources to establish filiation to a father who owed child support
even if the child was presumed to be the child of the husband of the
mother. The Department insisted upon the amendment to avoid
the effects of what it understood to be the intention of those who
drafted Articles 208 and 209--i.e., to deny to the child who
enjoyed legitimate filiation the right to institute an action to
establish filiation to one other than the husband of the mother. See
Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981, 42 La. L. Rev. 403
(1982).
Despite the statutory changes to the Civil Code and Title 46 of
the Revised Statutes described above, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 479 So.2d 324 (La.
1985), a succession case, interpreted Civil Code articles 208 and
209 as follows: "We conclude that children who fall into one of
the enumerated classes contained in Article 209 [i.e. a child who
enjoys legitimate filiation] are not precluded from instituting a
filiation action under that article, they are merely relieved of the
obligation to do so by operation of law." Thus, despite the
intention to end dual paternity in 1981 the Louisiana Supreme
Court confirmed the concept by its interpretation of the Civil Code
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articles. See also Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So.2d 287 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1985) (visitation sought by alleged biological father even
though child presumed to be child of husband of mother); Smith v.
Cole, 553 So.2d 847 (La. 1989) child support case brought against
biological father even though child presumed to be child of the
husband of the mother). The Smith case contains an excellent
discussion of all the Louisiana cases on dual paternity and U.S.
constitutional decisions affecting the issue of paternity.
Until 1992 the issue of dual paternity presented itself whenever
the husband of the mother had failed to disavow a child within the
peremptive period of Civil Code article 189 and the child (or
someone on his behalf) or the father sought to establish actual
paternity. Under the jurisprudence the husband of the mother was
conclusively presumed to be the father but proof could be offered
that someone else was the actual father under Civil Code articles
198, 200, 203 or 209. See Smith v. Cole, supra. However, in
Gnagie v. DHHR, 603 So.2d 206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), the First
Circuit Court of Appeals noticed, ex proprio motu, that the
husband of the mother of a child conceived and born during the
marriage was not the father of the child, and as a consequence, had
no right to bring a survival or wrongful death actionfor death of
the child. The court mischaracterized the issue as res nova in
Louisiana. In fact, another panel of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Cosey v. Allen, 316 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975),
decided the same issue, concluding that the husband of the mother
had a right of action but still had to prove damages. Since he had
no relationship with the child, he failed to prove that he had
suffered damage. See also Meaux v. Wiley, 325 So. 2d 655 (La.
Appl. 3d Cir. 1975). Interestingly, in the Gnagie case the trial
court had reached the same conclusion, with the assistance of a
jury, as the court had in Cosey v. Allen. In the Gnagie case the
court states: "The status of 'legal' father does not necessarily
confer on that alleged parent all of the rights and obligations of
paternity [i.e., a right to recover the child's wrongful death]." That
statement represents a significant departure from prior law and
suggests that the court can pick and choose among rights and
obligations as to the "legal" father. There is no suggestion,
however, that the court has the same choice in the case of the
biological father, who apparently has greater rights although he
committed adultery with the mother.
In the Gnagie case,
furthermore, the court permitted evidence not for the purpose of
establishing that a party to the action was the actual biological
father, but for the purpose of disproving that the husband of the
mother was the father. The court permitted essentially a form of
disavowal not instituted by the husband, who was in fact precluded
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from doing so because of Civil Code article 189 (lapse of more
than 180 days).
Persons Committee Deliberations
Against the background of the Louisiana jurisprudence, the
Persons Committee began discussing the drafts of new Civil Code
articles on filiation (parent/child relationship) more than four years
ago. We interrupted our work to draft articles on former
community property, but resumed our meetings on filiation last
spring.
The Title (Parent and Child) is tentatively arranged in three
of
and artificial means
chapters-maternity, paternity,
reproduction. At present the chapter on maternity consists of only
one article and is straightforward: "Maternity may be established
by a preponderance of the evidence." The chapter on artificial
means of reproduction will contain more articles identifying the
means
of
where artificial
mother in
circumstances
reproduction-such as surrogate motherhood, in vitro fertilization,
embryo transfer, and egg donation--are utilized to produce
offspring.
Initially, work on the chapter on paternity began with some
new formulations of the articles containing the presumption of
paternity. The Committee may suggest to the Council that the
presumption of paternity of a child born or conceived during the
marriage be narrowly drafted to apply only when the child has
registry (as by birth certificate) or the reputation of being the child
of the husband of the mother. The Committee will reconsider the
proposal after the Council acts on the policy issue of dual
paternity. If the Council concludes that the legislation should
continue to recognize dual paternity, then a narrow formulation
and application of the presumption would reduce the potential
instances of dual paternity, and in many cases thus permit the
alignment of legal and biological paternity.
In another conscious restriction of the presumption, the
Committee will suggest a new successor article to Civil Code
article 186, an article that resolves the dilemma of overlapping
legal presumptions of paternity where a child is conceived during
one marriage and born during another. The Committee will suggest
that in resolving the dilemma that the cause of termination of the
first marriage determine whether the first or second husband is
presumed to the father of the child. For example, if the first
marriage is dissolved by divorce, the second husband is presumed
to be the father; if the first marriage is dissolved by death, the first
husband is presumed to be the father. The rather obvious
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assumption underlying the distinction is that in cases where the
first marriage ends in divorce and the presumption applies to two
husbands, it is the second husband who is the biological father in a
majority of the cases.
The Committee also will suggest that for the first time under
Louisiana law the mother of the child be permitted to contest her
husband's paternity, but only (tentatively) for the purpose of
establishing that her present husband is the father. The factual
circumstances contemplated by the proposed article are that the
child is presumed to be the child of the mother's first husband but
the mother subsequently marries a man who acknowledges that the
child is his before or after the child's birth (i.e., Succession of
Mitchell, supra). The mother's action to contest paternity is like
that of the husband or his heirs, subject to a relatively short
peremptive period. Thus, the mother is permitted to establish
paternity to someone other than her former husband who is
presumed to be the father, but only if it is to establish paternity to
her present husband (child then will be part of intact marital
family).
The Committee proposals outlined above potentially restrict
the presumption of the husband's paternity of a child conceived or
born during the marriage, and afford others the opportunity to
contest it. Furthermore, after the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), the
Persons Committee believes that a State may provide that the
presumption of paternity is conclusive, precluding proof that
someone other than the husband of the mother is the father of the
child (no dual paternity recognized), without violating the
guarantee of the United States Constitution against the denial of
due process or equal protection. The same may be true under
parallel provision of the Louisiana Constitution. Cf In Re B.G.S.,
556 So.2d 545 (La. 1990).
Even though a State may deny dual paternity to a child who is
conceived or born during the marriage, the question remains,
should it as a matter of policy. Michael H., a case decided after
Smith v. Cole, supra, reopens for discussion the issue of whether
the state should recognize dual paternity if it is not constitutionally
mandated. The Persons Committee has debated and discussed the
matter on numerous occasions without reaching a consensus. The
principal alternatives consist of the two enumerated at the
beginning of this document: (1) overrule explicitly the
jurisprudence by refusing to recognize dual paternity; or (2) codify
existing jurisprudence by continuing to recognize dual paternity.
The tension inherent in choosing between these two principal
alternatives lies in the answer to the following question: Is it best
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for society to protect and preserve the marital unit, to provide for
the individual child's needs or to recognize biological fact? In
addition, the most recent case (Gnagie, supra) demonstrates the
need to restore order and certainty to the system of proof of
paternity; otherwise, a concursus proceeding will be required every
time there is a wrongful death action, succession proceeding, or
support claim. The interest of justice is served by clear definitive
rules on the subject.
The Persons Committee needs direction from the Council in
resolving this most serious of policy issues. The Committee
cannot proceed further with its work without a decision about dual
paternity. Resolving the issue is difficult because there are
compelling arguments for each alternative.
The Persons
Committee awaits your decision.

2007]

NEW LA W OFFILIA TION

355

Reciprocal Rights and Obligations of Parent and
Child
The parent/child relationship legally binds the two persons in
an intricate web of reciprocal rights and obligations, and in some
cases unilateral rights and obligations. The "what" of parental
obligations, at least the principal examples found in the Civil Code,
includes the following:
Parental authority over the minor child and resulting
responsibility for that child. Parents have authority to
control the behavior of the child (C.C. arts. 218-220), to
control and administer his property (C.C. arts. 221, 2333;
C.C.P. arts. 4501-4502), and to enjoy the fruits from his
property with a few exceptions (C.C. arts. 223-224, 226).
Parents also have a corresponding responsibility for his acts
that cause damage (C.C. arts. 237, 2318), and for this
support, education and maintenance (C.C. arts. 227, 230;
R.S. 9:315.1 et seq.). During and after termination of the
marriage by divorce, provisional proceedings permit a
parent or parents to seek custody and child support (C.C.
arts. 131 et seq., C.C. arts. 141 et seq., respectively).
Tutorship of minor children. If there is an occasion for
the tutorship of a minor child (C.C. arts. 246 et seq.),
parents as natural tutors have preference over all others and
also have authority under certain circumstances to appoint a
testamentary tutor (C.C. arts. 257, 258).
Ascendants
and descendants
(including majors)
continuing reciprocal obligations to support each other if in
need. C.C. art. 229 provides that children "are bound to
maintain their father and mother ... who are in need ...
and relatives in the direct ascending line are likewise bound
to maintain their needy descendants." The obligation is
limited to the necessities of life in the absence of other
available sources.
Reciprocal rights of inheritance. Children are within the
favored class of forced heirs (C.C. arts. 1493 et seq.) with
such rights as collation (C.C. arts. 1227 et seq.) and
reduction (C.C. arts. 1502 et seq.) and within the most
favored class of intestate heirs (C.C. art. 888). Parents, as
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defined by C.C. art. 891 [a definition more inclusive than
that of children under C.C. art. 3506(8)], are within the
second most favored class of intestate heirs as to separate
property of the deceased (C.C. arts. 891-897).
Right to institute the survival action and to recover for
wrongful death. Children fall within the most favored class
of beneficiaries and parents within the second most favored
class of beneficiaries (C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2).
Other rights and obligations. In addition to the above
mentioned rights and obligations there are also numerous
statutory examples of children and family modifying rights
and obligations or affecting them in other ways. See, e.g.,
C.C. art. 2355 (judicial authorization to act without
concurrence of spouse when action in best interest of
family); art. 2362 (alimentary obligation deemed
community obligation); art. 2365 (reimbursement upon
termination of community for community obligations
incurred for certain family expenses); and art. 2372 (spouse
solidarily liable with spouse who incurs obligation for
necessaries for family).
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Federal Statutory Rights of Children
Pay and Allowances of Uniformed Service. Members of the
uniformed services are entitled to certain allowances based on a
variety of circumstances including whether the member has
dependents. 37 U.S.C.A. § 401(2) defines dependents as a child or
"an illegitimate child whose alleged member-father has been
judicially decreed to be the father of the child or judicially ordered
to contribute to the child's support, or whose parentage has been
admitted in writing by the member" and who is under 21 or is
incapable of support.
Servicemen's Life Insurance. The servicemen's group life
insurance law provides for insurance for members of the armed
forces. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1965(8) defines "child" as a legitimate child
and "an illegitimate child as to the mother, or an illegitimate child
as to the alleged father, only if:
(A) he acknowledged the child in writing signed by him; or
(B) he has been judicially ordered to contribute to the
child's support; or (C) he has been before his death,
judicially decreed to be the father of such child; or (D)
proof of paternity is established by a certified copy of the
public record of birth or church record of baptism showing
that the insured was the informant and was named as father
of the child; or (E) proof of paternity is established from
service department or other public records, such as school
or welfare agencies, which show that with his knowledge
the insured was named as the father of the child.
Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. The Act
defines a child to include "a child in relation to whom the deceased
employee stood in loco parentis for at least one year prior to the
time of injury, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child
dependent on the deceased". 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(14).
Immigration laws. The immigration laws grant citizenship to
certain persons at birth. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409 provides for children
born out of wedlock as follows:
(a) The provisions of paragraph (c), (d), (e), and (g) of
section 1401 of this title, and of paragraph (2) of section
1408 of this title, shall apply as of the date of birth to a
person born out of wedlock if (1) a blood relationship
between the person and the father is established by clear
and convincing evidence, (2) the father had the nationality
of the United States at the time of the person's birth, (3) the
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father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide
financial support for the person until the person reaches the
age of 18 years, and (4) while the person is under the age of
18 years--A) the person is legitimated under the law of
the person's residence or domicile, (B) the father
acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath,
or (C) the paternity of the person is established by
adjudication of a competent court.
Other Federal rights: Copyright, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101, Judicial
Annuity, 28 U.S.C.A. § 376, Armed Forces Death Benefits, 10
U.S.C.A. § 1477, and Veteran's Benefits, 38 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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Proposed Filiation Articles Draft
Chapter 2. Paternity
SECTION

1. THE PRESUMPTION, DISAVOWAL [AND CONTESTATION]

Subsection a. The Presumption
Art. 185. Presumption ofpaternity of husband
The husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a
child born during the marriage or within three hundred days of the
termination of the marriage.
[This presumption shall apply only if the child is registered as
or has the reputation of being the child of the husband of the
mother.]
Art. 186. Presumption ofpaternity if child born after divorce
or after death of husband
If a child is born less than three hundred days following the
termination of a marriage, and his mother has married again before
his birth:
1. The new husband is presumed to be the father if the
previous marriage was terminated by judgment of divorce,
declaration of nullity, or declaration of death of an absent person.
2. The former husband is presumed to be the father if the
previous marriage was terminated by death.
Subsection b. Disavowal
Art. 187. Action in disavowal ofpaternity; standardofproof
The husband can disavow paternity of the child by clear and
convincing evidence that he is not the father. The testimony of the
husband must be corroborated by other evidence.
Art. 188. Loss of right in case of artificialmeans of conception
The husband of the mother cannot disavow a child born to his
wife as the result of artificial means of conception to which he
consented [with the intent to be recognized as the father.]
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QUESTION: If a man marries a pregnant woman and knows
that she is pregnant and that the child is not his, should he lose the
right of disavowal?
Art. 189. Peremptiveperiodfor disavowal by husbandor his
successors
An action for disavowal of paternity must be filed within a
peremptive period of one hundred eighty days after the husband
learned or should have learned of the birth of the child. If the
husband for reasons beyond his control is not able to file the action
timely, then the period of time for filing the action is suspended
during that period of inability.
If the husband dies within the period for filing the action
without having done so, his successor who is his relation by
consanguinity, adoption, or affinity and whose interest in the estate
will be reduced has one year from his death or one year from the
birth of the child, whichever period is longer, within which to file
the action.
Subsection c. Contestation
Art. 190. Contestationby mother
The mother may file an action to contest the paternity of the
former husband, but only to establish under Article 191 that her
present husband is the father of the child. The mother must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the former husband is not
the father. The testimony of the mother must be corroborated by
other evidence.
The action by the mother must be filed within one year of the
child's birth.
QUESTION: Should contestation by the mother be extended to
other instances? Is the action in contestation that of the mother or
of the child? If the former, should the child himself at some
mature age have the right to contest his paternity (of husband of his
mother)?
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SECTION

2.

SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Art. 191. Establishmentofpaternity by marriageofparents
and by acknowledgment
The paternity of a child is established by the marriage of the
child's mother to a man who has formally or informally
acknowledged the child as his before or after the child's birth.
Art. 192. Proofofpaternity by formal acknowledgment
A child may establish his paternity against the father who has
signed his birth certificate or who has declared his paternity in an
authentic act.
a formal
QUESTION: What effect should such
acknowledgment have in other contexts and if offered by someone
other than the child, such as the father?
SECTION

3. ACTION TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY

Art. 193. Establishment ofpaternity by judgment; standardof
proof
An action to establish paternity may be brought by the child [or
a person on his behalf] if paternity is not otherwise established
under the preceding articles of this Chapter.
Such action must be brought within twenty-four years of the
child's birth or within one year of the alleged father's death,
whatever first occurs.
In an action to establish paternity filed during the life of the
alleged father, proof must be made by a preponderance of the
evidence. In an action to establish paternity filed after the death of
the alleged father, proof of paternity must be made by clear and
convincing evidence.

362

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67

APPENDIX C
Comparison Between 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) and
Louisiana Law
This document will compare 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) and
Louisiana law to determine if Louisiana law complies with and
does not conflict with any provision of 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) as it
relates to paternity establishment and voluntary acknowledgments.
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)
(5) Procedures concerning paternity establishment.(A) Establishment process available from birth until age 18.(i) Procedures which permit the establishment of the paternity
of a child at any time before the child attains 18 years of age.
(ii) As of August 16, 1984, clause (i) shall also apply to a child
for whom paternity has not been established or for whom a
paternity action was brought but dismissed because a statute of
limitations of less than 18 years was then in effect in the State.
(Louisiana law: Civil Code Articles 185 to 198 and R.S.
9:391.1 to 400.1 provide for the establishment of paternity and for
voluntary acknowledgments. Proposed Louisiana HB No. 322
proposes amendments and additions to current law. If enacted,
R.S. 9:401 to 406 will add provisions relative to filiation and
paternity. Present Louisiana law, C.C. Art. 197, provides that a
child may bring an action to establish paternity even though he is
presumed to be the child of another man. However, for purposes
of succession only, this action is subject to a preemptive period of
one year. Present Louisiana law, C.C. Art. 198, provides that a
man may bring an action to establish his paternity of a child at any
time except as provided in C.C. Art. 198. Proposed HB 322
repeals R.S. 9:395.1 and enacts R.S. 9:404 to provide that the
preemptive periods in C.C. Art. 198 shall apply to the Louisiana
Department of Social Services when providing services in
accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 666.)
(B) Procedures concerning genetic testing.(i) Genetic testing required in certain contested cases.Procedures under which the State is required, in a contested
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paternity case (unless otherwise barred by State law) to require the
child and all other parties (other than individuals found under
section 654(29) of this title to have good cause and other
exceptions for refusing to cooperate) to submit to genetic tests
upon the request of any such party, if the request is supported by a
sworn statement by the party(I) alleging paternity, and setting forth facts establishing a
reasonable possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the
parties; or
(II) denying paternity, and setting forth facts establishing a
reasonable possibility of the nonexistence of sexual contact
between the parties.
(ii) Other requirements.-Procedures which require the State
agency, in any case in which the agency orders genetic testing(I) to pay costs of such tests, subject to recoupment (if the State
so elects) from the alleged father if paternity is established; and
(II) to obtain additional testing in any case if an original test
result is contested, upon request and advance payment by the
contestant.
(Louisiana law provides for blood or tissue sampling to
determine paternity in R.S. 9:396 to 398.2:
R.S. 9:396. Authority for test; ex parte orders; use of results
[HB 322 proposes to amend this Section by adding the underlined
text and deleting the striked text.]
A.(l) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, in any civil action in which paternity is a relevant fact, or
in an action en desaveu, the court may, on its own initiative, or
shall, under either of the following circumstances, order the
mother, child, and alleged father, or the mother's husband or
former husband in an action en desaveu, to submit to the collection
of blood or tissue samples, or both, and direct that inherited
characteristics in the samples, including but not limited to blood
and tissue type, be determined by appropriate testing procedures:
(a) Upon request made by or on behalf of any person
whose blood or tissue is involved, provided that such request is
supported by a sworn affidavit alleging specific facts which either
tend to prove or deny paternity.
(b) Upon motion of any party to the action made at a time
so as not to delay the proceedings unduly.
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(2) If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the court may
resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce its
order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
B.(1) The district attorney, in assisting the Department of
Social Services in establishing paternity as authorized by R.S.
46:236.1.1 et seq., may file a motion with a court of proper
jurisdiction and venue prior to and without the necessity of filing
any other legal proceeding. Upon ex parte motion of the district
attorney and sworn affidavit of the party alleging specific facts
tending to prove paternity and other facts necessary to establish the
jurisdiction and venue of the court, the court shall issue an ex parte
order directing the mother, her husband or former husband, child,
and alleged father to appear at a certain date and time to submit to
the collection of blood or tissue samples, or both and shall direct
that inherited characteristics in the samples, including but not
limited to blood and tissue type, be determined by appropriate
testing procedures. The order shall be personally served upon the
If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the
alleged father.
court, in a subsequent civil action in which paternity is a relevant
fact, may resolve the question of paternity against such party or
enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice
so require.
(2) If the written report of the results of the initial testing
absolves a party from the allegation of paternity, the district
attorney and the department shall be enjoined from initiating any
subsequent civil action against that party to establish paternity of
the same child. If the written report fails to absolve a party from
the allegation of paternity, such report may be used by the district
attorney or the department as evidence against the alleged father in
any subsequent civil action for the establishment of paternity or by
the alleged father in any subsequent proceeding in which filiation
is an issue.
C.(l) Prior to ordering the alleged father to submit to
paternity testing under the provisions of this Section, the court
may, upon motion of the alleged father and after a contradictory
hearing, order a person presumed to be the father of the child,
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code ..ieles 181 and 1852
to produce the results of prior blood or tissue testing or to submit
to the collection of blood or tissue samples, or both, and direct that
inherited characteristics in the samples, including but not limited to
blood and tissue type, be determined by appropriate testing
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procedures. If the written report of the results of the testing
negates the presumption that this person is the father of the child,
only then may the court order the alleged father to submit to
paternity testing.
(2) If a presumed father is unknown by the parties or
unavailable to submit to testing, then the court shall resolve the
matter in the interest ofjustice in chambers.
R.S. 9:397. Selection of expert
The tests shall be conducted by a court appointed expert or
experts qualified as examiners of blood or tissue samples for
inherited characteristics, including but not limited to blood and
tissue type. The number and qualifications of such expert or
experts shall be determined by the court.
R.S. 9:397.1. Compensation of expert witnesses and recovery
of testing costs
A. The costs of the blood or tissue tests conducted by the
expert witness appointed by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable
amount. The costs shall be advanced by the party who requested
that such tests be conducted. If the court orders the blood or tissue
tests on its own motion, the petitioner shall advance the costs of
the tests. In either case, the court shall tax the costs to the party
against whom judgment is rendered. The compensation of each
expert witness appointed by the court and called by a party shall be
fixed at a reasonable amount. It shall be paid by the party against
whom judgment is rendered, which shall be taxed as costs of court.
B. If the state, a political subdivision of the state, or the
petitioner pays the initial costs of testing under this Part in a
paternity action, the state, political subdivision, or petitioner may
recover those costs from an individual only if he is found to be the
father of the child in the action. The court shall determine the
manner in which the reimbursement for the costs shall be made.
R.S. 9:397.2. Chain of custody of blood or tissue samples
The chain of custody of blood or tissue samples taken under
this Part may be established if documentation of the chain of
custody is submitted with the expert's report and if such
documentation was made at or near the time of the chain of
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custody and was made in the course of regularly conducted
business activity.
R.S. 9:397.3. Admissibility and effect of test results
A.(1) A written report of the results of the initial testing,
certified by a sworn affidavit by the expert who supervised the
tests, shall be filed in the suit record. The affidavit shall state in
substance:
(a) That the affiant is qualified as an examiner of blood or
tissue samples for inherited characteristics, including but not
limited to blood and tissue types, to administer the test and shall
give the affiant's name, address, telephone number, qualifications,
education, and experience.
(b) How the tested individuals were identified when the
samples were obtained.
(c) Who obtained the samples and how, when, and where
the samples were obtained.
(d) The chain of custody of the samples from the time
obtained until the tests were completed.
(e) The results of the test and the probability of paternity as
calculated by an expert based on the test results.
(f) The procedures performed to obtain the test results.
(2) A notice that the report has been filed shall be mailed by
certified mail to all parties by the clerk of court or shall be served
in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure Article 1314.
(3) A party may challenge the testing procedure within thirty
days of the date of receipt or service of the notice.
B.(1) If the court finds there has been a procedural error in the
administration of the tests, the court shall order an additional test
made by the same laboratory or expert.
(2)(a) If there is no timely challenge to the testing procedure
or if the court finds there has been no procedural error in the
testing procedure, the certified report shall be admitted in evidence
at trial as prima facie proof of its contents, provided that the party
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against whom the report is sought to be used may summon and
examine those making the original of the report as witnesses under
cross-examination. The summons for the individual making the
original of the report may be served through his employer's agent
for service of process listed with the secretary of state or served
pursuant to R.S. 13:3201 et seq.
(b) A certified report of blood or tissue sampling which
indicates by a ninety-nine and nine-tenths percentage point
threshold probability that the alleged father is the father of the
child creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity.
C. Any additional testing ordered by the court pursuant to this
Part shall be proved by the testimony of the expert.
D. If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts as
disclosed by the reports, based upon the tests, are that the alleged
father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall
be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or
conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence.
R.S. 9:398. Applicability to criminal actions
This part shall apply to criminal cases subject to the
following limitations and provisions:
(1) An order for the tests shall be made only upon application
of a party or on the court's initiative;
(2) The compensation of the experts shall be paid by the parish
of the party's domicile under order of court;
(3) The
conclusions
9:397.3(D),
upon all the

court may direct a verdict of acquittal upon the
of all the experts under the provisions of R.S.
otherwise the case shall be submitted for determination
evidence.

R.S. 9:398.1. Award of attorney's fees in actions to establish
paternity
When the court renders judgment in favor of a party seeking to
establish paternity, it shall, except for good cause shown, award
attorney's fees costs to the prevailing party. However, the
provisions of this Section shall not apply to compensation of expert
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witnesses and recovery of blood or tissue testing costs in
accordance with R.S. 9:397.1.
R.S. 9:398.2. Petition for order to submit to blood or tissue
*tests prior to bringing filiation action [HB 322 proposes to amend
this Section by adding the underlined text.]
A.(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, the husband of the mother, prior to filing an action of
disavowal of a child born or conceived during his marriage to the
mother and prior to the expiration of the time required to file an
action of disavowal, may petition a court of proper jurisdiction and
venue for an order directing the mother, child, and petitioner to
submit to the collection of blood or tissue samples, or both, for
determination of paternity for the purpose of exercising rights
relating to the child. The filing of the petition suspends the period
for bringing the disavowal action for a period of one year from the
date the petition is filed.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary,
the alleged biological father of a child born outside of marriage,
prior to filing any action to establish filiation of the child, may
petition a court of proper jurisdiction and venue for an order
directing the mother, child, and petitioner to submit to the
collection of blood or tissue samples, or both, for determination of
paternity for the purpose of exercising rights relating to the child.
B. The petition authorized in Paragraphs (1) and (2) of
Subsection A of this Section shall name the mother as defendant
and shall allege specific facts tending to prove the relationship or
the circumstances of any physical relationship with the mother, or
facts tending to prove paternity, and other facts necessary to
establish the jurisdiction and venue of the court.
C. The court, after contradictory hearing, may order the parties
to submit to blood or tissue samples, or both, and direct that
inherited characteristics in the samples, including but not limited to
blood and tissue type, be determined by appropriate testing
procedures as provided in this Part.
D. If the court issues an order directing blood or tissue tests, or
both, the provisions of R.S. 9:397 through 397.2 and 397.3(A) and
(B) shall be applicable to the selection and compensation of
experts, payment of testing costs, establishment of chain of
custody, filing of test results in the court record, and authority of
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the court to order additional tests if it finds there has been a
procedural error in the administration of the tests.
E. The court shall not make a determination of paternity based
on the test results and conclusions of the experts filed in the record;
however, the test results shall be admissible in any subsequent
action filed by any of the parties relating to filiation of the child.
F. The provisions of this Section shall not in any manner
affect the status of a child whose legal father is the husband of the
mother who does not timely disavow paternity of the child nor
affect any right that a child may have to file an action of filiation as
provided by law.)
(C) Voluntary paternity acknowledgment.(i) Simple civil process.-Procedures for a simple civil process
for voluntarily acknowledging paternity under which the State
must provide that, before a mother and a putative father can sign
an acknowledgment of paternity, the mother and the putative father
must be given notice, orally, or through the use of video or audio
equipment, and in writing, of the alternatives to, the legal
consequences of, and the rights (including, if 1 parent is a minor,
any rights afforded due to minority status) and responsibilities that
arise from, signing the acknowledgment.
(Louisiana law: R.S. 9:392 provides the following:
R.S. 9:392. Delaration of acknwldgment Acknowledgment;
requirements; content [HB 322 proposes to amend this Section by
adding the underlined text and deleting the striked text.]
A. Prior to the execution of a dec.larati
of an
acknowledgment pursuant te Civil Code Artiele 203 of paternity,
the notary shall provide in writing, and orally or by directing them
to video or audio presentations, to the party or parties making the
deelafatien acknowledgment of the following:
(1) Either party has the right to request a genetic test to
determine if the alleged father is the biological father of the child.
(2) The alleged father has the right to consult an attorney
before signing an acknowledgment of paternity.
(3) If the alleged father does not acknowledge the child, the
mother has the right to file a paternity suit to establish paternity.
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(4) After the alleged father signs an acknowledgment of
paternity, he has the right to pursue visitation with the child and
the right to.petition for custody.
(5) Once an acknowledgment of paternity is signed, the father
may be obligated to provide support for the child.
(6) Once an acknowledgment of paternity is signed, the child
will have inheritance rights and any rights afforded children born
in wedlock.
(7)(a) A party who executed a netair-a1aet an authentic act of
acknowledgment may feseid revoke the act, without cause, before
the earlier of the following:
(i) Sixty days after the signing of the act, in a judicial
hearing for the limited purpose of r-es-indin revoking the
acknowledgment.
(ii) A judicial hearing relating to the child, including a child
support proceeding, wherein the affiant to the netaia aet authentic
act of acknowledgment is a party to the proceeding.
(b) Thereafter, the acknowledgment of paternity may be
voided only upon proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that
such act was induced by fraud, duress, of material mistake of fact,
or error, or that the fathe person who executed the authentic act of
acknowledge is not the biological father.
(8) All parties to the action have any other rights and
responsibilities which may be afforded by law now or in the future.
B. In addition to the general requirements of the Civil Code,
an acknowledgment of a child born outside of marriage shall
include the social security numbers of the father and mother, and,
in accordance with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(7), shall
include all minimum requirements specified by the secretary of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services. Failure
to recite a party's social security number as required herein shall
not affect the validity of the declaration.)
(ii) Hospital-based program.-Such procedures must include a
hospital-based program for the voluntary acknowledgment of
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paternity focusing on the period immediately before or after the
birth of a child.
(Louisiana law: R.S. 40:46.1 provides the following:
R.S. 40:46.1. Hospital-based paternity program
A. Any hospital in the state which provides birthing services
shall have a program that allows for the voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity during the period immediately before
or after the birth of a child.
B. During the period immediately before or after the birth of a
child to an unmarried woman, a hospital-based program
established in accordance with this Section shall, at a minimum:
(1) Provide to both the mother and alleged father, if he is
present in the hospital:
(a) Written materials about paternity establishment.
(b) The forms necessary to voluntarily acknowledge
paternity.
(c) A written description of the rights, responsibilities, and
alternatives as provided in R.S. 9:392(A) which are involved in
acknowledging paternity.
(d) The opportunity to speak with hospital personnel, either
by telephone or in person, who are trained to clarify information
and answer questions about paternity establishment.
(2) Provide the mother and alleged father, if he is present, the
opportunity to voluntarily acknowledge paternity in the hospital in
accordance with the Civil Code and R.S. 9:392.
(3) Afford due process safeguards.
(4) Forward completed acknowledgments to the state registrar.
C. Hospital support personnel that provide birthing services
shall possess notarial powers to administer oaths to and
authenticate signatures of any persons in connection with
execution of a formal acknowledgment of paternity in accordance
Any oaths administered or signatures
with this Section.
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authenticated pursuant to this Section shall have the same force
and effect as if taken or signed before a duly commissioned notary
public.
D. Hospital personnel shall forward an acknowledgment of
paternity to the state registrar who shall forward copies of same to
the Department of Social Services, office of family support,
support enforcement services. A statewide data base shall be
maintained by the Department of Social Services in accordance
with federal regulations.
E. A voluntary acknowledgment executed in accordance with
this Section shall be signed by both parents and the parents'
signatures shall be authenticated by a person possessing notarial
powers in accordance with state laws.
F. The Department of Social Services, office of family
support, support enforcement services shall provide to all birthing
hospitals in the state:
(1) Written materials about paternity establishment.
(2) Forms necessary to voluntarily acknowledge paternity.
(3) Copies of a written description of the rights,
responsibilities, and alternatives as provided in R.S. 9:392(A)
which are involved in acknowledging paternity.
(4) Training, guidance, and written instructions relative to
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, as necessary to operate the
hospital-based program.
(5) An assessment of each birthing hospital's program on at
least an annual basis.
G. Except in the case of intentional misconduct, no hospital or
any agent or employee thereof shall be held civilly or criminally
liable for any action or omission arising out of the performance of,
attempted performance of, or failure or inability to perform the
duties imposed herein.)
(iii) Paternity establishment services.(I) State-offered services.-Such procedures must require the
State agency responsible for maintaining birth records to offer
voluntary paternity establishment services.
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(II) Regulations.(aa) Services offered by hospitals and birth record agencies.The Secretary shall prescribe regulations governing voluntary
paternity establishment services offered by hospitals and birth
record agencies.
(bb) Services offered by other entities.-The Secretary shall
prescribe regulations specifying the types of other entities that may
offer voluntary paternity establishment services, and governing the
provision of such services, which shall include a requirement that
such an entity must use the same notice provisions used by, use the
same materials used by, provide the personnel providing such
services with the same training provided by, and evaluate the
provision of such services in the same manner as the provision of
such services is evaluated by, voluntary paternity establishment
programs of hospitals and birth record agencies.
(Louisiana law: R.S. 40:46.2 provides the following:
R.S. 40:46.2. Paternity establishment services
The state registrar shall provide voluntary paternity
establishment services in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the secretary of the United States Department of Health and
Human Services. The state registrar may designate specific
employees in the offices of the vital records registry who shall
possess notarial powers to administer an oath to any person in
connection with any document required in the course of
establishing paternity.)
(iv) Use of paternity acknowledgment affidavit.-Such
procedures must require the State to develop and use an affidavit
for the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity which includes the
minimum requirements of the affidavit specified by the Secretary
under section 652(a)(7) of this title for the voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity, and to give full faith and credit to
such an affidavit signed in any other State according to its
procedures.
(Louisiana law: R.S. 9:392(B) and 393 provide the following:
R.S. 9:392. Declaration of acknowledgment; requirements;
content
B. In addition to the general requirements of the Civil Code,
an acknowledgment of a child born outside of marriage shall
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include the social security numbers of the father and mother, and,
in accordance with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(7), shall
include all minimum requirements specified by the secretary of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services. Failure
to recite a party's social security number as required herein shall
not affect the validity of the declaration.
R.S. 9:393. Full faith and credit of acknowledgments
Full faith and credit shall be given by Louisiana courts to an
affidavit acknowledging paternity executed in any state in
accordance with the laws and procedures of that state.)
(D) Status of signed paternity acknowledgment.(i) Inclusion in birth records.-Procedures under which the
name of the father shall be included on the record of birth of the
child of unmarried parents only if(I) the father and mother have signed a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity; or
(II) a court or an administrative agency of competent
jurisdiction has issued an adjudication of paternity.
Nothing in this clause shall preclude a State agency from
obtaining an admission of paternity from the father for submission
in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or prohibit the issuance
of an order in a judicial or administrative proceeding which bases a
legal finding of paternity on an admission of paternity by the father
and any other additional showing required by State law.
(Louisiana law: R.S. 40:34(B)(h) provides the following:
R.S. 40:34. Vital records forms
B.*

*

(h)(i) Full name of father if the father was the husband of
the mother of the child at the time of conception and birth of the
child or had not been legally divorced from the mother of the child
for more than three hundred days prior to the birth of the child. If
the husband of the mother was not the biological father of the
child, the full name of the biological father may be recorded in
accordance with the provisions of Item (vi) or (vii) of
Subparagraph (a). A subsequent successful disavowal action by
the husband of the mother or his heirs pursuant to Civil Code
Article 189 may later affect this entry and the child's surname.
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Otherwise, the full name of the father may be recorded as provided
by Item (iv) of Subparagraph (a).
(ii) Full name of father if a court has issued an adjudication
of paternity.
(iii) In all other cases, the name of the father and other
information pertaining to the father shall not appear on the birth
certificate and the surname of the child shall be recorded as the
maiden name of the mother.
(iv) Nothing in this Subparagraph shall preclude the
Department of Social Services, office of family support, support
enforcement services from obtaining an admission of paternity
from the biological father for submission in a judicial proceeding,
or prohibit the issuance of an order in a judicial proceeding which
bases a legal finding of paternity on an admission of paternity by
the biological father and any other additional showing required by
state law.
(v) In the case of a child born of a surrogate birth parent
who is a blood relative of a biological parent, the full name of the
biological parent who is proven to be the father by DNA testing
shall be listed as the father.
(vi) In the case of a child born outside of marriage whose
certificate of birth fails to list the full name of the father, the full
name of the biological father who is proven to be the father by
DNA testing shall be listed as the father upon submission, by the
mother or father of the child born outside of marriage, to the
registrar of vital records for the Department of Health and
Hospitals of a certified copy of the DNA test results establishing
paternity of the biological father.)
(ii) Legal finding of paternity.-Procedures under which a
signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is considered a
legal finding of paternity, subject to the right of any signatory to
rescind the acknowledgment within the earlier of(I) 60 days; or
(II) the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding relating
to the child (including a proceeding to establish a support order) in
which the signatory is a party.
(iii) Contest.-Procedures under which, after the 60-day period
referred to in clause (ii), a signed voluntary acknowledgment of
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paternity may be challenged in court only on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon
the challenger, and under which the legal responsibilities
(including child support obligations) of any signatory arising from
the acknowledgment may not be suspended during the challenge,
except for good cause shown.
(Louisiana law: Civil Code Article 196, R.S. 9:392(A)(7), and
proposed R.S. 9:392.1 provide the following:
C.C. Art. 196. Formal acknowledgment; presumption [HB 322
proposes to amend this Article by adding the underlined text and
deleting the striked text.]
A man may, by authentic act or by signing the birth certificate,
The
acknowledge a child not filiated to another man.
acknowledgment creates a presumption that the man who
acknowledges the child is the father. The presumption can be
invoked only on behalf of the child. Except in those cases handled
as otherwise provided by
by he Department e-SeeilSe,
law, the acknowledgment does not create a presumption in favor of
the man who acknowledges the child. In those supprt and
visitan cases handled by the Department of Social Ser.'iees, the
acknowledgment is deemed to be a legal finding of paternity and is
sufficient to establish an obligationt to support the child and to
establish visitation without the necessity of obtaining a judgment

R.S. 9:392. Declaration of akneoldgmen Acknowledgment;
requirements; content [HB 322 proposes to amend this Section by
adding the underlined text and deleting the striked text.]
A. Prior to the execution of a declaration of an
acknowledgment pusuant to Civil Code Afic le 203 of paternit
the notary shall provide in writing, and orally or by directing them
to video or audio presentations, to the party or parties making the
deelaratien acknowledgment of the following:
(7)(a) A party who executed a neta ial aet an authentic act of
acknowledgment may *eseind revoke the act, without cause, before
the earlier of the following:
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(i) Sixty days after the signing of the act, in a judicial
hearing for the limited purpose of feseindin revoking the
acknowledgment.
(ii) A judicial hearing relating to the child, including a child
support proceeding, wherein the affiant to the netafial ae authentic
act of acknowledgment is a party to the proceeding.
(b) Thereafter, the acknowledgment of paternity may be
voided only upon proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that
such act was induced by fraud, duress, of material mistake of fact,
or error, or that the fhe person who executed the authentic act of
acknowledge is not the biological father.
Proposed R.S.
support; visitation

9:392.1.

Acknowledgment;

obligation to

In child support and visitation cases, the acknowledgment of
paternity by authentic act is deemed to be a legal finding of
paternity and is sufficient to establish an obligation to support the
child and to establish visitation without the necessity of obtaining a
judgment of paternity.)
(E) Bar on acknowledgment ratification proceedings.Procedures under which judicial or administrative proceedings
are not required or permitted to ratify an unchallenged
acknowledgment of paternity.
(Louisiana law: C.C. Art. 196 and proposed R.S. 9:392.1
provide the following:
C.C. Art. 196. Formal acknowledgment; presumption [HB 322
proposes to amend this Article by adding the underlined text and
deleting the striked text.]
A man may, by authentic act or by signing the birth certificate,
The
acknowledge a child not filiated to another man.
acknowledgment creates a presumption that the man who
acknowledges the child is the father. The presumption can be
invoked only on behalf of the child. Except in these eases handl d
by the Dpartment of Sceial Ser.-.cc as otherwise provided by
law, the acknowledgment does not create a presumption in favor of
the man who acknowledges the child. in those suppr t d
.isitaion eases handled by the Depatfeat of Social Ser.'ieez, the
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acknowledgment is deemfed to be a legal finding of paternity and is
suffieient to establish an obligationt to support the child and to
establish visitation without the neesity of obtaining a judgment
ofpateffit
Proposed R.S.
support; visitation

9:392.1.

Acknowledgment;

obligation

to

In child support and visitation cases, the acknowledgment of
paternity by authentic act is deemed to be a legal finding of
paternity and is sufficient to establish an obligation to support the
child and to establish visitation without the necessity of obtaining a
judgment of paternity.)
(F) Admissibility of genetic testing results.-Procedures(i) requiring the admission into evidence, for purposes of
establishing paternity, of the results of any genetic test that is(I) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by
accreditation bodies designated by the Secretary; and
(II) performed by a laboratory approved by such an
accreditation body;
(ii) requiring an objection to genetic testing results to be made
in writing not later than a specified number of days before any
hearing at which the results may be introduced into evidence (or, at
State option, not later than a specified number of days after receipt
of the results); and
(iii) making the test results admissible as evidence of paternity
without the need for foundation testimony or other proof of
authenticity or accuracy, unless objection is made.
(Louisiana law provides for blood or tissue sampling to
determine paternity in R.S. 9:396 to 398.2. For the texts of these
statutes, please see pages 2-9 supra.)
(G) Presumption of paternity in certain cases.-Procedures
which create a rebuttable or, at the option of the State, conclusive
presumption of paternity upon genetic testing results indicating a
threshold probability that the alleged father is the father of the
child.
(Louisiana law: R.S. 9:397.3 and provides the following:
R.S. 9:397.3. Admissibility and effect of test results
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A.(1) A written report of the results of the initial testing,
certified by a sworn affidavit by the expert who supervised the
tests, shall be filed in the suit record. The affidavit shall state in
substance:
(a) That the affiant is qualified as an examiner of blood or
tissue samples for inherited characteristics, including but not
limited to blood and tissue types, to administer the test and shall
give the affiant's name, address, telephone number, qualifications,
education, and experience.
(b) How the tested individuals were identified when the
samples were obtained.
(c) Who obtained the samples and how, when, and where
the samples were obtained.
(d) The chain of custody of the samples from the time
obtained until the tests were completed.
(e) The results of the test and the probability of paternity as
calculated by an expert based on the test results.
(f) The procedures performed to obtain the test results.
(2) A notice that the report has been filed shall be mailed by
certified mail to all parties by the clerk of court or shall be served
in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure Article 1314.
(3) A party may challenge the testing procedure within thirty
days of the date of receipt or service of the notice.
B.(1) If the court finds there has been a procedural error in the
administration of the tests, the court shall order an additional test
made by the same laboratory or expert.
(2)(a) If there is no timely challenge to the testing procedure
or if the court finds there has been no procedural error in the
testing procedure, the certified report shall be admitted in evidence
at trial as prima facie proof of its contents, provided that the party
against whom the report is sought to be used may summon and
examine those making the original of the report as witnesses under
cross-examination. The summons for the individual making the
original of the report may be served through his employer's agent
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for service of process listed with the secretary of state or served
pursuant to R.S. 13:3201 et seq.
(b) A certified report of blood or tissue sampling which
indicates by a ninety-nine and nine-tenths percentage point
threshold probability that the alleged father is the father of the
child creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity.
C. Any additional testing ordered by the court pursuant to this
Part shall be proved by the testimony of the expert.
D. If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts as
disclosed by the reports, based upon the tests, are that the alleged
father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall
be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or
conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence.)
(H) Default orders.-Procedures requiring a default order to be
entered in a paternity case upon a showing of service of process on
the defendant and any additional showing required by State law.
(Louisiana law: General provisions of Louisiana law, Code of
Civil Procedure Articles 1701 to 1704, provide the law relative to
default.)
(I) No right to jury trial.-Procedures providing that the
parties to an action to establish paternity are not entitled to a trial
by jury.
(Louisiana law: Code of Civil Procedure Article 1732 provides
the following:
C.C.P. Art. 1732. Limitation upon jury trials
A trial by jury shall not be available in:
(3) A ... filiation ... proceeding.
(J) Temporary support order based on probable paternity in
contested cases.-Procedures which require that a temporary order
be issued, upon motion by a party, requiring the provision of child
support pending an administrative or judicial determination of
parentage, if there is clear and convincing evidence of paternity
(on the basis of genetic tests or other evidence).
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(Louisiana law: R.S. 9:399 provides the following:
R.S. 9:399. Establishment of child support; interim order
during proceeding; final order following judgment of paternity
A. In a proceeding for the determination of paternity and upon
motion of any party, the court presiding over the paternity issue
shall issue an order of interim child support if there is clear and
convincing evidence of paternity on the basis of genetic testing or
other evidence susceptible of independent verification or
corroboration.
B. If no interim child support was ordered pursuant to
Subsection A of this Section, a judgment for final child support
rendered against a defendant who has acknowledged paternity after
a paternity suit has been filed or has been adjudged in a suit to
establish paternity to be the parent of the child for whom support is
ordered shall be effective from the date on which the paternity suit
was filed. In the event the court finds good cause for not making
the award retroactive to the date of the filing of the paternity suit,
the court may make the award retroactive to a date subsequent to
the filing of the paternity suit, but in no event shall the award be
fixed later than the date of the rendition of the paternity judgment.
Any monetary support provided by the judgment debtor, from the
date the petition for support is filed to the date the final support
order is issued to or on behalf of the person for whom support is
ordered, may be credited to the judgment debtor against the
amount of the judgment.)
(K) Proof of certain support and paternity establishment
costs.-Procedures under which bills for pregnancy, childbirth,
and genetic testing are admissible as evidence without requiring
third-party foundation testimony, and shall constitute prima facie
evidence of amounts incurred for such services or for testing on
behalf of the child.
(Louisiana law: R.S. 9:394 provides the following:
R.S. 9:394. Evidence of hospital bills and tests in paternity
action
In an action to establish paternity, originals or certified copies
of bills for pregnancy, childbirth, and genetic testing shall be
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule and shall be prima
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facie evidence that the amounts reflected on the bills were incurred
for such services or testing on behalf of the child. Extrinsic
evidence of authenticity of the bills, or their duplicates, as a
condition precedent to admissibility shall not be required.)
(L) Standing of putative fathers.-Procedures ensuring that the
putative father has a reasonable opportunity to initiate a paternity
action.
(Louisiana law: C.C. Art. 198 provides the following:
C.C. Art. 198. Father's action to establish paternity; time period
A man may institute an action to establish his paternity of a
child at any time except as provided in this Article. The action is
strictly personal.
If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the
action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the birth
of the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the
father of the child regarding his paternity, the action shall be
instituted within one year from the day the father knew or should
have known of his paternity, or within ten years from the day of
the birth of the child, whichever first occurs.
In all cases, the action shall be instituted no later than one year
from the day of the death of the child.
The time periods in this Article are preemptive.)
(M) Filing of acknowledgments and adjudications in state
registry of birth records.-Procedures under which voluntary
acknowledgments and adjudications of paternity by judicial or
administrative processes are filed with the State registry of birth
records for comparison with information in the State case registry.
(Louisiana law: R.S. 40:34 provides the following:
34. Vital records forms
B. The forms shall be printed and supplied or provided by
electronic means by the state registrar and the required contents
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(1) Contents of birth certificate. The certificate of birth shall
contain, as a minimum, the following items:
(a) Full name of child.
(iv)If the child is born outside of marriage, the surname of
the child shall be the mother's maiden name. If the father is known
and if both the mother and the father agree, the surname of the
child may be that of the father or a combination of the surname of
the father and the maiden name of the mother. For purposes of this
Item, "father" means a father who has acknowledged his child or
who has been judicially declared the father in a filiation or
paternity proceeding.
(v) Any change in the surname of a child from that required
herein or to that allowed herein shall be by court order as provided
for in R.S. 13:4751 through 4755 or as otherwise provided in this
Chapter or by rules promulgated thereunder.
(vi) Notwithstanding the provisions of Item (B)(1)(a)(iii),
and except as otherwise provided in Item (B)(1)(a)(vii), if the
father of the child is not the husband of the mother, the surname of
the child may be the maiden name of the mother, or, if the mother,
husband, and father agree, the surname of the child may be that of
the father or a combination of the surname of the father and the
maiden name of the mother. The Department of Health and
Hospitals, office of public health, shall develop a form for the
purposes of implementing this Item. However, the provisions of
this Item shall be limited to cases wherein the husband and mother
have lived separate and apart continuously for a minimum of one
hundred eighty days prior to the time of conception of the child
and have not reconciled since the beginning of the one hundred
eighty-day period, as evidenced by an affidavit of the parties
submitted to the registrar.
(vii) In the case of a child born of the marriage, which
includes cases where both a person, presumed to be the father
pursuant to the Civil Code, and a biological father exist, the
surname of the child's biological father who has been judicially
declared to be the father of the child in a filiation or paternity
proceeding, either prior or subsequent to the birth of the child,
shall be the surname of the child, if the biological father has sole or
joint custody of the child and the presumed father, if any, is no
longer married to the mother. If the biological father and the
mother agree, the surname of the child shall be the maiden name of
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the mother or a combination of the surname of the biological father
and the maiden name of the mother. The child's mother, the
husband of the mother, and the biological father shall be
indispensable parties in a filiation or paternity proceeding brought
-under this Item, except when parental rights have been terminated
or the person is deceased.
(h)(i) Full name of father if the father was the husband of
the mother of the child at the time of conception and birth of the
child or had not been legally divorced from the mother of the child
for more than three hundred days prior to the birth of the child. If
the husband of the mother was not the biological father of the
child, the full name of the biological father may be recorded in
accordance with the provisions of Item (vi) or (vii) of
Subparagraph (a). A subsequent successful disavowal action by
the husband of the mother or his heirs pursuant to Civil Code
Article 189 may later affect this entry and the child's surname.
Otherwise, the full name of the father may be recorded as provided
by Item (iv) of Subparagraph (a).
(ii) Full name of father if a court has issued an adjudication
of paternity.
(iii) In all other cases, the name of the father and other
information pertaining to the father shall not appear on the birth
certificate and the surname of the child shall be recorded as the
maiden name of the mother.
(iv) Nothing in this Subparagraph shall preclude the
Department of Social Services, office of family support, support
enforcement services from obtaining an admission of paternity
from the biological father for submission in a judicial proceeding,
or prohibit the issuance of an order in a judicial proceeding which
bases a legal finding of paternity on an admission of paternity by
the biological father and any other additional showing required by
state law.
(v) In the case of a child born of a surrogate birth parent
who is a blood relative of a biological parent, the full name of the
biological parent who is proven to be the father by DNA testing
shall be listed as the father.
(vi) In the case of a child born outside of marriage whose
certificate of birth fails to list the full name of the father, the full
name of the biological father who is proven to be the father by
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DNA testing shall be listed as the father upon submission, by the
mother or father of the child born outside of marriage, to the
registrar of vital records for the Department of Health and
Hospitals of a certified copy of the DNA test results establishing
paternity of the biological father.
D. The state registrar of vital records is hereby authorized to
amend an original birth certificate in accordance with a final court
order which specifically orders the amendments, provided the
court's order complies with existing Louisiana laws.
E.(1) If the child is a child born outside of marriage and the
father is known to the mother, she shall complete and sign a
paternity information form issued by the Vital Records Registry
which shall include the name and date of birth of the child, full
name of the father, his mailing address, his street address or the
location where he can be found, his date of birth, and the name of
his parent or guardian if he is a minor, his state and city of birth,
his social security number, and his place of employment, if known.
Within fifteen days after the date of admission, the hospital or
birthing facility shall forward the form to support enforcement
services, office of family support, Department of Social Services,
with such information as the mother has provided. If the birth
occurred at a location other than a licensed hospital or birthing
facility, the form shall be completed at the time the home birth is
recorded by the Vital Records Registry and submitted to support
enforcement services within fifteen days thereafter. If the natural
father has not executed an acknowledgment of paternity, the
mother shall sign as the informant unless she is medically unable
or mentally incompetent in which case her guardian or legal
representative shall sign.
(2) The department shall serve notice on the alleged father that
he has been named as the father of the child. If the alleged father
is a minor, service shall be made upon his parent or guardian. The
notice shall be served by certified mail, return receipt requested.
The notice shall include the name of the child and the name of the
mother of the child and shall advise the alleged father how the
allegation of paternity can be contested. The notice shall also
advise the alleged father that he can request that blood tests be
conducted, and that the alleged father can sign an acknowledgment
of paternity.
(3) Upon receiving the notice, the alleged father shall have
ninety days to contest the allegation that he is the father. He shall
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do so by advising the department in writing that he is not the
father. If the alleged father fails to contest the allegation in writing
within ninety days, he shall be presumed to be the father of the
child, for support purposes only, and the agency or the custodial
parent can use this presumption in an action to seek a support
order.
(4) If the alleged father contests paternity at the hearing for
support, the court may order blood tests.
(5) If the results of the blood test indicate by a probability of
99.9% or higher that the alleged father is in fact the father of the
child, or if the alleged parent fails to appear for the court-ordered
blood tests, the court shall rule that he is the father of the child, for
purposes of support only, and shall issue an order for support in
accordance with state law.
(6) Nothing in this Subsection shall be deemed, construed, or
interpreted to create any presumption of legal paternity for any
purpose other than support as set forth in this Subsection.
(7) In the event the alleged father is found not to be the father,
all costs of the hearing, medical costs, expert witnesses costs, and
costs incurred by the alleged father defending himself shall be paid
by the party who made the allegations against the alleged father.)

